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A RADICAL RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
OF SELLER'S DAMAGES: NEW YORK
RESULTS COMPARED
ROBERT J. HARRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS is the fourth in a series of articles concerned with the measurement
of expectation damages' in contract cases where plaintiff is a
"seller. ' 12 In the first article,3 my notions of how damages should be
measured were set forth. This article restates those views and considers
the results of relevant New York decisions.4 Other articles compare my
notions with the case law of California3 and Michigan and the pro-
visions of the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.-
Rules of law treating the measure of expectation damages must answer
four questions: (1) what is to be valued; (2) what technique of valuation
should be used; (3) which party has the burden of going forward to prove
the value; (4) how should the value, once ascertained, be taken into
account.
Conventional judge-made law and statutory law on expectation damage
measurements consist of three discrete bodies of authority: (1) state-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledgc
the very extensive help of Alex Fisher of the Michigan Bar and John V. Donnelly, L'65,
Mark E. Schlussel, L'65, Richard F. Vitkus, L'65, and Alice A. Winters, L'66, of the
Universit
- 
of Michigan Law School.
1. Expectation damages are damages whose prime function is to make plaintiff as well off
as if the contract had been fully performed.
2. "Seller" is used here to include anyone whose performance is more than or different
from payment of money. It includes sellers of realty, services and personalty, as well as
bailors and lessors. For the rationale of the definition, see notes 26-31 infra and accompanying
temL
3. Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach of Con-
tract, 60 .Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1962) [hereinafter cited as General Theory].
4. Some changes have been made in the theory presented in the first article, chiefly regard-
ing burden of proof and the lost volume problem. The~present article, unlike the first one,
is not confined to total breach cases. Terminology has changed slightly from article to article
in an effort to gain clarity. Although effort was expended to examine every New York case
involving the measurement of seller's damages, stylistic reasons have necessitated abridgment
of the citation of those authorities which agree with my views.
5. Graham & Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: California
Results Compared, 18 Stan. L. Rev. - (1965).
6. Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Lan, of Seller's Damages: Michigan Rezults Com-
pared, 61 Mich. L. Rev. S49 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Seller's Damages (Ilichigan)].
7. Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Com-
mercial Code Results Compared, IS Stan. L. Rev. - (1965).
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ments of abstract guiding policies; (2) what can be called "parochial
damage formulae"; and (3) scattered rulings on the burden of proof. The
statements of abstract guiding policies, recognized in New York as else-
where, can be summarized thus: (1) unless one of the following five
policies would be thwarted, plaintiff should recover a sum which, when
added to the benefits he already received under the contract, will give him
an economic status' identical to the one he would have enjoyed if the
contract had been performed precisely as agreed; 9 (2) there is no
recovery for items of loss unforseeable to defendant at the time of con-
tracting;" ° (3) there is no recovery for those consequences of breach
which plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable self-protective care;11
8. The general rule denies recovery for mental anguish. 1 Clark, New York Law of Dam-
ages § 153 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Clark]; 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1076 (1951) [herein-
after cited as Corbin]; Restatement, Contracts § 341 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Restate-
ment]; Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1367 (1963). New York recognizes some rare exceptions, See,
e.g., Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920) (female guest
suffered physically and mentally from innkeeper's verbal abuse); Finley v. Atlantic Transp.
Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917) (body wrongfully buried at sea instead of carried
ashore). Breach of promise to marry was another exception, Wolters v. Schultz, 1 Misc. 196,
21 N.Y. Supp. 768 (N.Y. City Ct. 1892), until the action was abolished by statute, N.Y.
Civ. Rights Law § 90.
9. E.g., St. George Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 205 N.Y. 121, 98 N.E. 387 (1912),
reversing 143 App. Div. 544, 128 N.Y. Supp. 393 (2d Dep't 1911); Wakeman v. Wheeler
& Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 4 N.E. 264 (1886); Danolds v. State, 89 N.Y. 36 (1882);
Bagley v. Smith, 10 N.Y. 489 (1853); Industrial Eng'r Co. v. Republic Storage Co., 220 App.
Div. 178, 220 N.Y. Supp. 623 (1st Dep't 1927); Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. McKinney, 137
App. Div. 541,121 N.Y. Supp. 845 (3d Dep't 1910), aff'd, 203 N.Y. 533, 96 N.E. 1122 (1911);
1 Clark § 154. See also General Theory 577 n.3.
10. This requirement is variously expressed as involving foresecability, tacit assent to lia-
bility by defendant, that the item of loss be the natural and probable consequence of breach,
that it arise directly from the breach. See, e.g., Long Island Contracting & Supply Co. v.
City of New York, 204 N.Y. 73, 97 N.E. 483 (1912) ; United States Trust Co. v. O'Brien, 143
N.Y. 284, 38 N.E. 266 (1894) ; Devlin v. Mayor of the City of New York, 63 N.Y. 8 (1875) ;
Ashburner v. Balchen, 7 N.Y. 262 (1852); A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 533, 300
N.Y. Supp. 226 (2d Dep't 1937), modified mem. on other grounds, 253 App. Div. 813, 1
N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep"t 1938). See generally 1 Clark § 160; 5 Corbin § 1007; McCormick,
Damages §§ 137-41 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; Restatement § 330.
11. This is known as the "duty to mitigate damages" or the "doctrine of avoidable con-
sequences" and is recognized in New York. See, e.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills,
252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605, motion to amend remittitur granted, 253 N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770
(1930); Fulton v. Canno, 222 N.Y. 189, 118 N.E. 633 (1918); Beattie v. New York & L.I.
Constr. Co., 196 N.Y. 346, 89 N.E. 831 (1909), modifying 127 App. Div. 923, 111 N.Y. Supp.
1109 (2d Dep't 1908); Milage v. Woodward, 186 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E. 873 (1906); McCready
v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 65 N.E. 208 (1902); Ashburner v. Balchen, 7 N.Y. 262 (1852).
But see White & Carter, Ltd. v. McGregor, [1962] 2 Weekly L.R. 17 (H.L.); Goodhart,
Measure of Damages When a Contract is Repudiated, 78 L.Q. Rev. 263 (1962). See generally
1 Clark § 106; 5 Corbin § 1039; McCormick §§ 3342; Restatement § 336; Annot., 81 A.L.R.
282 (1932).
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(4) all of plaintiff's gains causally related to the breach must be taken
into account in measuring damages,'2 whether or not plaintiff was obli-
gated by the mitigation notion to incur the risks that were involved in
achieving the particular gain;1" (5) all items not proved with sufficient
certainty are to be ignored in damage measurement; 11(6) all of plain-
tiff's expenditures in reasonable efforts to avoid the consequences of
breach can be recovered,15 whether or not the effort ultimately proves
successful.'6
A typical "parochial damage formula" appears in the Uniform Sales
Act:
Section 64. Action for damages for non-acceptance of goods.
(3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of
damages is, in the absence of special circumstances showing proimate damage of
a greater amount, the difference between the contract price and the market or current
price at the time or times when the goods ought to have been accepted, or, if no
time was fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to accept.' 7
Another typical one, used where plaintiff is a building contractor and
defendant-owner committed a total breach, appears in Restatement of
12. See, e.g., Fulton v. Canno, supra note 11; Beattie v. New York & L.I Constr. Co.,
supra note 11; McCready v. Lindenborn, supra note 11; Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N.Y. 469, 21
N.E. 1012 (18S9); Canda v. Wick, 100 N.Y. 127, 2 N.E. 3S1 (1855). See also 1 Clark § 120;
5 Corbin § 1041; McCormick § 160.
13. There is no New York case on point. Apparently the only authority in the United
States for this proposition is Griffin v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 297 Pac.
662 (1931). Th commentators cited in note 3 supra are in accord. I Clark § 120; S Corbin
§ 1041; Restatement § 336, comment a. See also Cockburn v. Trusts & Guar. Co., [1917]
Can. Sup. Ct. 264, 269-70, 1917] 37 D.L.R. 701, 704 (1917), affirming [1917] OnL L.R. 396,
[1917] 33 D.L.R. 159 (App. Div. Sup. Ct. 1917); British Westinghouse Elec. & AMfg. Co. v.
Underground Elec. Ry., [1912] A.C. 673, 6S7-92 (dictum).
14. See pp. 35-36 infra. See also 1 Clark § 154; 5 Corbin § 1020; McCormidck §§ 25-32;
Restatement § 331(1); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1950); AnnoL, 78 A.L.R. 853 (1932).
15. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N.Y. 469, 21 N.E. 1012 (18S9); Lewis v. Greider,
51 N.Y. 231 (1872); A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 533, 3C0 N.Y. Supp. 226 (2d
Dep't 1937), modified mem. on other grounds, 253 App. Div. 813, 1 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't
193); Hayes v. Durham, 194 App. Div. S43, 185 N.Y. Supp. 691 (3d Dept 1921); Keenan
& Son, Inc. v. Johns-Mlanville Co., 184 App. Div. 98, 171.N.Y. Supp. 532 (1st Dcp't 1918);
1 Clark § 114; 5 Corbin § 1044; McCormick § 42; Restatement § 336(2); Annot, Z4 A.L.R.
171 (1933).
16. There is no New York authority precisely on point. See Development Co. of America
v. King, 170 Fed. 923 (2d Cir. 1909) ; Baker v. lode Millinery Co., 193 II1. App. 507 (1915) ;
Rench v. Hayes Equip. lfg. Co., 134 Kan. 865, S P.2d 346 (1932); 1 Clark § 114; 9
Corbin § 1044; Restatement § 336(2).
17. Uniform Sales Act § 64(3). For the New York provision, see N.Y. Pen. Prop. Lav
§ 145(3) (repealed by N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102). This material is now covered by N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 2-708.
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Contracts: "[T]he entire contract price and compensation for unavoidable
special harm that the defendant had reason to foresee when the contract
was made, less installments already paid and the cost of completion that
the builder can reasonably save by not completing the work .... "I"
Yet another, this quoted from Corbin on Contracts, governs cases in
which plaintiff is an employee wrongfully discharged by defendant-
employer before plaintiff substantially completed the service of a par-
ticular period for which a definite wage installment was the agreed
equivalent. The measure is "the total amount of the unpaid wages that
were promised to him for his service, less the amount that he can earn by
making reasonable effort to obtain similar service under another
employer."' 9
Each parochial damage formula is specifically tailored for a single kind
of breach (such as nonperformance, rather than tardy or defective per-
formance), for a single kind of contract (such as sale of goods, rather
than bailment or sale of realty or sale of services), and for acts by a
certain party (such as plaintiff-seller, rather than plaintiff-buyer). In
theory, at least, there are as many of these parochial rules as there are
fact situations to be litigated.
The last of the three conventional bodies of doctrine concerns burden
of proof. The case law on this topic usually is too fragmentary to provide
anything deserving the name "rules." Typically, it consists of (1) scat-
tered holdings devoid of generalization 0 and (2) oscillating judicial en-
dorsements of two overly broad and inconsistent positions. One of these
18. Restatement § 346(2) (a). This formula is used in New York. See, e.g., McMaster
v. State, 108 N.Y. 542, 15 N.E. 417 (1888); Devlin v. Mayor of the City of New York, 63
N.Y. 8 (1875); Story v. New York & H.R.R., 6 N.Y. 85 (1851); Wetter v. Kleinert, 139
App. Div. 220, 123 N.Y. Supp. 755 (2d Dep't 1910); Carlin v. City of New York, 132
App. Div. 90, 116 N.Y. Supp. 346 (2d Dep't 1909); 1 Clark §§ 322, 325.
19. 5 Corbin § 1095, at 516. E.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347,
169 N.E. 605, motion to amend remittitur granted, 253 N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770 (1930);
Everson v. Powers, 89 N.Y. 527 (1882); Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362 (1875); Griffin v.
Brooklyn Ball Club, 68 App. Div. 566, 73 N.Y. Supp. 864 (4th Dep't 1902), aff'd, 174
N.Y. 535, 66 N.E. 1109 (1903); Baker Transfer Co. v. Merchants' Refrigerating & Ice
Mfg. Co., 12 App. Div. 260, 42 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1st Dep't 1896); 1 Clark §§ 305, 307.
20. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Davies, 146 N.Y. 25, 40 N.E. 501 (1895); McMaster v. State,
108 N.Y. 542, 15 N.E. 417 (1888); Fletcher v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 41 App. Dlv. 30,
58 N.Y. Supp. 612 (4th Dep't 1899), aff'd, 169 N.Y. 571, 61 N.E. 1129 (1901); Henderson
Importing Co. v. Breidbart, 182 N.Y. Supp. 169 (App. T. 1920); Worcester Bleach & Dye
Works Co. v. Dlugasch, 181 N.Y. Supp. 44 (App. T. 1920); Annots., 17 A.L.R.2d 968 (1951);
134 A.L.R. 242 (1941). The problem is barely mentioned in the Restatement, probably because
it was not considered to be substantive. But see Restatement § 333(d), stating that defendant
has the burden of proving that the plaintiff made a losing contract in reliance damage
cases.
[Vol. 34
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shibboleths is to the effect that plaintiff has the burden of proving his
damages21 suggesting that plaintiff always has the burden of proving
all aspects of damage measurement, including the value of what he saved
or should have saved because of the breach. The other purported com-
mand provides that defendant, being the part, at fault, has the burden
of proving mitigation-what plaintiff saved or should have saved thanks
to breach. 2 Probably in all states, despite the presence of one or both of
these supposed rules in the judicial literature, there are some situations
in which defendant consistently has the burden of proving what plain-
tiff saved or should have saved,23 and there are other situations in which
this burden is routinely placed upon plaintiff."
Conventional doctrine does not address itself directly to the choice
among valuation techniques, although the various parochial damage
formulae give some clues. Underlying this series of articles is an assump-
tion that the doctrine makes more sense when restated in valuation terms.
These articles involve an effort to restate in such terms one sector of
expectation damage law-the part that governs cases in which plaintiff is
a "seller." 25
21. E.g., United States Trust Co. v. O'Brien, 143 N.Y. 284, 3S N.E. 266 (1.94); Nichols
v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N.Y. 471, 33 N.E. 561 (1S93); Baird v. Mayor of the City of New
York, 83 N.Y. 254 (iSSo); Hewlett v. Caplin, 275 App. Div. 797, 83 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st Dep't
1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 591, 93 N.E.2d 492 (1950); Watts v. Phillips-Jones Corp., 211 App.
Div. 523, 207 N.Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dep't 1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y. 557, 152 'N.E. 425 (1926);
Babbitt v. ides Motor Sales Corp., 17 Aisc. 2d 239, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. T. 1959). Cf.
Restatement § 333(d).
22. See, e.g., Costigan v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 2 Denio CO9, 616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846). See
also Restatement § 331, comment c: "Doubts are generally resolved against the party com-
mitting the breach of contract."
23. See cases where plaintiff, a full-time employee, is wrongfully discharged before the
end of his term contract. E.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery AMil, 252 N.Y. 347, 169
N.E. 605, motion to amend remittitur granted, 253 N.Y. 333, 171 N.E. 770 (1930); Image
v. Woodward, 186 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E. 873 (1906); Bobrick v. Mackenzie, 192 App. Div. 594,
183 N.Y. Supp. 203 (1st Dep't 1920). See also 1 Clark § 309; Annots., 41 A.L.R.2d 955
(1955); 134 A.L.R. 242 (1941).
24. See cases where plaintiff is a seller of staple goods. E.g., Derami, Inc. v. John B.
Cabot, Inc., 273 App. Div. 717, 79 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1943); Belle of Bourbon Co.
v. Leffler, S7 App. Div. 302, 84 N.Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dep't 1903); Case v. Simonds, 7 N.Y.
Supp. 253 (App. Div. 5th Dep't 1889); Henderson Importing Co. v. Breidbart, 182
N.Y. Supp. 169 (App. T. 1920). See also 2 Clark § 794; Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1336 (1941).
25. By and large, the question of the date on which value should he measured will not
be treated. For discussion of this vexing question, see 1 Clark §§ 253, 266; 5 Corbin § KOS;
McCormick § 4S; Restatement § 338; Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17
Yale L. 443 (1908); Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199,
275-76 (1963); Editorial, 66 Cent. L.J. 365, 383 -(1903); Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 215 (1953);
Comment, 17 Yale L.J. 611 (1903); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 114 (1925).
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A. A Single General Rule
A single general rule can answer two of the four basic questions in
all expectation damage cases." The rule is: Plaintiff should recover
(minuend minus subtrahend) plus incidental damages. -7 The "minuend"
is always the value to plaintiff28 of the difference between what defendant
promised to do and what he in fact actually did in the way of perform-
ance. The "subtrahend" is always the value to plaintiff of being relieved
by defendant's breach from all or part29 of plaintiff's scheduled perform-
ance. 0 "Incidental damages" are always the value to plaintiff of the
26. The rule is thought to be useful whether plaintiff is the "seller" or not; whether
the subject matter of the contract is realty, personalty, services, or some combination;
whether the transfer of property is permanent (sale or exchange), or temporary (bailment
or lease) ; whether the promises were aleatory or not; whether the breach was "total" or
"partial"; whether the defendant's default was non-performance, defective performance, or
tardy performance; whether the breach was anticipatory or not; whether the contract was
unilateral, bilateral, or a non-bargain agreement supported by some substitute for con-
sideration.
27. "Minuend minus subtrahend" appears in parentheses to show that it is the arithmetic,
not algebraic, sum of the parenthetical matter and incidental damages which is recovered.
If the minuend is $50, the subtrahend $75 and the incidental damages $5, plaintiff recovers
$5, not zero. His $5 recovery is really a reliance damage recovery; a zero recovery would
be called for if the goal were to give plaintiff the equivalent of full performance on both
sides-the expectation remedy. This assumes that plaintiff's reliance damage remedy can
exceed what he could recover on an expectation damage theory. The New York law is in
accord. See Borough Dev. Co. v. Harmon, 154 App. Div. 689, 139 N.Y. Supp. 362 (2d Dep't
1913), aff'd, 214 N.Y. 691, 108 N.E. 1089 (1915).
There is scattered authority in other states for the proposition that reliance damages
must be reduced by the sum that plaintiff saved by not performing the balance of the
contract. See L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 189-91 (2d Cir.
1949); Restatement § 333(a); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1951). If "saved" means
"expenses not incurred" as well as "resale losses not sustained," in these other states the
plaintiff can never recover, as reliance damages, more than he could have recovered as
expectation damages. Thus, in such states plaintiff should recover the algebraic sum of
the parenthetical matter and his incidental damages.
28. Value to the promisee, not to the plaintiff, is relevant in cases where plaintiff is an
assignee. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923);
St. George Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 205 N.Y. 121, 98 N.E. 387 (1912),
reversing 143 App. Div. 554, 128 N.Y. Supp. 393 (2d Dep't 1911); Nichols v. Scranton
Steel Co., 137 N.Y. 471, 33 N.E. 561 (1893); Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N.Y. 469, 21 N.E. 1012
(1889); Devlin v. Mayor of the City of New York, 63 N.Y. 8 (1875); 1 Clark § 10.
29. In a "total breach" case, plaintiff is relieved of all his remaining scheduled or
promised performance. Of course, if plaintiff has fully performed, he is relieved of nothing.
Where the breach relieves plaintiff only of part of his remaining scheduled or promised
performance, courts often speak of the breach as partial or of the contract as divisible.
30. No adjustment is needed, of course, if plaintiff fully performed his side of the con-
tract before defendant's breach; or if the contract did not contemplate any return
performance by plaintiff and was enforceable because of some substitute for present
[Vol. 34
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expenses and/or losses he reasonably incurred after notice of breach in
his attempts to mitigate damages.3'
This single general rule answers the questions of what is to be valued
and how the value, once computed, shall be taken into account. Its uni-
versality, of course, is possible only because it ignores questions of
valuation technique and burden of proof. The answers it gives to the
two other questions are identical to those of the parochial formulae. If
the parochial formulae are stripped of their references to valuation
technique, they all turn out to be elliptical statements of this single
general rule.
B. Consistentcy With Conventioal Parochial Rides
Parochial measurement formulae are almost always e.xpressed ellipti-
cally. For example, the Uniform Sales Act rule, quoted earlier, 2 says the
measure of damages in a certain situation is the difference between the
contract price and the market or current price. It does not state expressly
that it really means "the unpaid balance of the contract price," and not
"the contract price."33 The omission has no significance in a case where
none of the price has been paid at the time of breach, but the omission
becomes important if defendant-buyer has prepaid all or part of the price.
However, in cases where the latter problem is presented, courts uni-
versally include in the formula an adjustment to reflect that part of the
price that was paid.34 The parochial formulae typically omit reference to
consideration, such as formalism, past consideration, or action in reliance; or if the
contract contemplated an aleatory return performance by plaintiff, and the aleatory
condition qualifying plaintiff's duty to perform was neither met nor excused. But, if a return
performance by plaintiff was contemplated, and it was neither rendered nor excused for non-
fulfillment of an aleatory condition, in measuring expectation damages, account must be
taken of plaintiff's saved performance. If plaintiff is the promisee in a "unilateral contract"-
one in which plaintiff does not promise to perform-but he has not fully p2formed at the
time of defendant's breach, plaintiff's saved performance should be taken into account in
measuring expectation damages. This is true because, although plaintiff's remaining per-
formance was never promised, he could not fulfill his expectations of receiving defendant's
performance without rendering all of his own.
31. The term is conventionally used in this sense, but not defined in this manner. E.g.,
N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-710: "Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the trans-
portation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or
resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach."
32. Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
33. The Uniform Commercial Code is more precise: "the difference between the market
price... and the unpaid contract price together Ath any incidental damagi ... ." N.Y.
U.C.C. § 2-70S(1).
34. E.g., Everson v. Powers, S9 N.Y. 527 (18S2); Lewis v. Greder, 51 N.Y. 231 (1872);
Dillon v. Anderson, 43 N.Y. 231 (1S70); Baer v. Durham Duplex Razor Co., 22S App. Div.
1965]
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items which, although deserving attention when they arise, occur only
infrequently. Thus, the builder's formula, quoted earlier," makes no
reference to the value of materials which the builder has bought to per-
form the contract and which are still on hand when the breach stops
further performance. However, when such items are present in a builder
case, they are taken into account, his recovery being reduced by the net
resale value of such materials.3 6 Other examples of similar ellipses were
presented in an earlier article 37 of this series.
The single general rule is identical with all parochial measurement
formulae which are concerned with expectation damages. There are some
parochial formulae, however, which are concerned with measuring plain-
tiff's recovery under some other remedy, and these rules, of course, can-
not be stated in terms of minuend, subtrahend, and incidental damages."
Loose judicial language, referring to all remedies which result in a judg-
ment for a sum of money as "damages," sometimes blurs the distinctions
among these various contract remedies: the price, expectation damages,
reliance damages, money restitution, foreclosure and sale with deficiency
judgment, statutory remedies, seller's specific performance remedy, and
the peculiar measure used for vendor's "good faith" failure to produce
marketable title. The single general rule is only the equivalent of those
parochial rules which aim at giving expectation damages.
The single general rule leaves unanswered questions of valuation and
burden of proof. These matters require additional rules which are
numerous, albeit not as numerous as the parochial damage formulae that
they are designed to replace. For convenience, attention in these articles
is limited to the valuation and proof burden problems of only two of the
three terms-the subtrahend and the incidental damages. In cases where
plaintiff is a "seller"--one whose performance is not merely payment of
350, 239 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 570, 173 N.E. 870 (1930). See also
1 Clark § 5.
35. Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Long Island Contracting & Supply Co. v. City of New York, 204 N.Y. 73,
97 N.E. 483 (1912); McMaster v. State, 108 N.Y. 542, 15 N.E. 417 (1888); Danolds v.
State, 89 N.Y. 36 (1882); Dillon v. Anderson, 43 N.Y. 231 (1870); Beckwith v. City of
New York, 121 App. Div. 462, 106 N.Y. Supp. 175 (2d Dep't 1907); 1 Clark § 325.
37. Seller's Damages (Michigan) 855-58.
38. For example, in New York and many other states, plaintiff cannot recover expecta-
tion damages where defendant, a vendor of land, is guilty of a "good faith" breach of his
promise to deliver marketable title to the land. E.g., Northridge v. Moore, 118 N.Y. 419, 23
N.E. 570 (1890); Cockroft v. New York & H.R.R., 69 N.Y. 201 (1877); Margraf v. Muir,
57 N.Y. 155 (1874); Conger v. Weaver, 20 N.Y. 140 (1859). See 1 Clark § 203 n.6; 5
Corbin §§ 1097-98; McCormick § 178; Annots., 68 A.L.R. 137 (1930); 48 A.L.R. 12
(1927). Instead, if plaintiff seeks damages, he gets a smaller recovery. Parochial formulae
governing this situation are not equivalent to the single general rule.
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a sum of money-the minuend presents no hard valuation problems and
the two terms discussed in these articles provide all the controversy.?9
Hence, while the titles of the articles refer to "seller's damages," they
might more accurately speak of "subtrahend valuation" as the scope
limit.
I have excluded from consideration cases in which the valuation
problem could be regarded as either a matter of subtrahend or minuend
valuation. For example, where plaintiff is a manufacturer who contracted
to buy raw materials from defendant, defendant's failure to deliver may
cause plaintiff to close down his plant for a week. The minuend-the
value to plaintiff of the difference between what defendant promised to
do (deliver the raw materials) and what he did (nothing) may be valued
not by replacement cost, but by reference to plaintiff's larger transaction
(manufacturing) which floundered temporarily because of the breach. Of
course, the minuend will not be valued by reference to the larger trans-
action unless the requirements of mitigation, foreseeability, and certainty
are met. Where valuation is by reference to the halted manufacturing
process, it is customary to speak of plaintiff recovering his lost profits-
the gross receipts he otherwise would have garnered, reduced by what he
saved by virtue of not operating his factory that week. It is possible to
view these lost profits as the value of the minuend.
But, in computing these lost profits, it was necessary to take into
account the raw materials that plaintiff would have consumed if he had
operated the factory that week. The saved cost of acquisition of these
materials is an item that goes to reduce plaintiff's recovery. Because this
item already has been taken into account in valuing the minuend, it
should not be further regarded in the subtrahend. Put another way,
where the minuend is valued by reference to plaintiff's lost profits on some
larger transaction and, in computing those profits, account was taken of
the saved cost of acquiring the performance that defendant promised but
failed to deliver, plaintiff recovers minuend plus incidental damages.
Viewed thus (which is how I have viewed it), what plaintiff saved when
breach released him from his duty to pay defendant is a matter of minu-
end, not subtrahend, valuation and lies outside these articles. 0
39. W"here plaintiff is a "buyer"--one who is to recdve a performance which is not
merely a payment of a sum of money-the minuend provides the valuation problems.
Because the minuend, but not the subtrahend, can reach values vastly greater than the
contract price-as in Hadley v. Baxendale, L.R. 9 Ex. 341 (1354)--doctrines such as fore-
seeability and certainty are invoked in a fashion rarely encountered in cases involing
subtrahend valuation.
40. I have held to this analysis even where the performance that plaintiff raved vas
not merely the payment of a sum of money, but something harder to value. For example,
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C. Policies Governing Burden of Proof
Unable to find policies concerning allocation of the burden of proof
expressed in the general case law of the country, and unable to extrap-
olate such policies from the six abstract rules presented earlier, I have
made up my own notions of proof burden policy. One reason for the
series of articles is to discover the extent to which case law results
correlate with the results that my notions would dictate. Since my defense
of the policies appears elsewhere in depth,4 I shall merely restate my
conclusions with some explanatory remarks: (1) where allocation of the
burden is tantamount to resolving the issue against whichever party is
laden with the burden (because it is impossible to locate admissible
evidence in sufficient quantity to establish the facts even if the court
lowers the standard of "certainty" below conventional levels), three
policies should be taken into account, in this order of importance: (a)
that party should have the burden who will suffer the less severe conse-
quence when he fails to sustain it; (b) where the issue is susceptible to
a yes-or-no answer,42 it is best to place the burden on the party asserting
the less likely state of affairs; (c) it should be allocated to encourage
loss-splitting and to foster loss distribution; (2) where allocation of the
burden is not tantamount to resolving the issue, the burden should
coincide with superior access to the evidence needed to sustain it; (3)
where it is not clear how often the burden will be insupportable in a
particular class of cases, considerations of access to the evidence should
be subordinated to the other considerations to the extent that broad pre-
trial discovery rules tend to equalize access to evidence.
Some of these notions require amplification. As regards the existence
or value of items whose value is added to the subtrahend, the conse-
quences are more severe if plaintiff, rather than defendant, has the burden
of proof. For if plaintiff fails to prove the value of any such item, he must
be deprived of all expectation damages. It is necessary to visit him with
such a Draconian penalty in order to get him to establish items which,
once established, reduce his recovery. On the other hand, if defendant has
the burden of proving such items, it suffices to value at zero those items
which defendant fails to establish, leaving the other expectation damage
measurement issues unaffected. This policy leads to giving defendant the
in some cases plaintiff is defendant's partner, and defendant's breach of the partnership
aareement entities plaintiff to his share of lost partnership profits-which cannot be
computed without valuing the services that plaintiff would have contributed in the future.
E.g., Bagley v. Smith, 10 N.Y. 489 (1853).
41. Seller's Damages (Michigan) 860-70.
42. Such as the question: Could plaintiff have handled another similar contract
simultaneously? Questions of dollar value are not susceptible to a yes-or-no answer.
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burden of proving the existence and value of all items which go to enhance
the subtrahend.
If plaintiff has an alternative way to vindicate his expectation interest
(such as a suit for specific performance), and defendant has the burden
of proof on some item that augments the subtrahend in expectation
damage suits, plaintiff's power to elect the damage remedy may be abused
in cases where the value of the item is unprovable. Plaintiff may elect his
damage remedy in the hope of being overcompensated when defendant
fails to carry the burden. This argues for giving plaintiff the burden as
to such items if he has an alternative e-xpectation-vindicating remedy.
As to items which, when established, reduce the subtrahend, defendant
must be visited with a fairly severe penalty to force him to prove facts
that augment plaintiff's recovery. This can be done only by valuing the
entire subtrahend at zero if defendant fails to prove any one such item.
If plaintiff has the burden to prove the value of such an item, it suffices
to value it at zero if the burden is not carried. This policy supports giving
plaintiff the burden of proving the existence and value of items which go
to reduce the subtrahend, irrespective of whether plaintiff has a remedy
alternative to expectation damages.
The interplay of all these policies leads me to support a scheme which
gives plaintiff the burden of proving almost all issues. On issues as to
which it is usually impossible for plaintiff to muster enough precise proof
to carry the burden, the courts should relax the standard of "certainty" if
plaintiff has no alternative remedy to vindicate his expectation interest.
Otherwise, plaintiff will be undercompensated more often than policy
justifies.
My search of the New York plaintiff-seller contract cases revealed only
one opinion discussing proof burden policy." In this 1846 supreme court
case, plaintiff had been wrongfully discharged from his post as a railroad
superintendent and remained idle for the remaining ten months of his
year's contract. The referee, presuming that a reasonable man would have
found new employment within three months of discharge, allowed no
recovery for the last seven months of the contract period. Plaintiff argued
that there should be no presumption that he could have found comparable
re-employment by reasonable effort and that defendant should have the
burden unassisted by such a presumption. The basic arguments of plain-
tiff were: (1) it is more probable that comparable employment was un-
43. Costigan v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 2 Denio 609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1&6). A municipal
court case implied that proof burden should correlate v.ith ease of access to the evidence
and probability. J. K. Rishel Furniture Co. v. Stuyvesant Co., 123 MA'c. 203, 204 N.Y.
Supp. 659 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1924).
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available than available; (2) the burden of proving a fact rests with him
who asserts it and who would avail himself of it; (3) idleness is a vice,
and a dereliction of duty is never presumed; (4) every presumption
should be made against a wrongdoer; (5) it would be easier for defend-
ant to show that comparable jobs were available to plaintiff than for
plaintiff to show the contrary since availability could be established by
evidence of a single employer offer, whereas non-availability would not be
established by evidence that plaintiff had made many applications which
failed.44
The court sided with the plaintiff, giving these reasons:
But first of all the defence set up should be proved by the one who sets it up, He seeks
to be benefitted by a particular matter . . . alleged by him. The rule requires him to
prove an affirmative fact, whereas the opposite rule would call upon the plaintiff to
prove a negative, and therefore the proof should come from the defendant. He is the
wrongdoer, and presumptions, between him and the person wronged, should be made
in favor of the latter.45
The notion that he who pleads should prove begs the question, for
then the critical issue is: Who has the burden of pleading that plaintiff
could have mitigated his damages?4" The idea of "proving a negative" is
weak, too. In a crude sense the issue is susceptible to a yes-or-no answer:
Was there any demand at all for plaintiff's talent? But the issue is more
plausibly stated as a question of quantity: How much would a reasonable
man with plaintiff's skills have earned when breach cast him forth on
the labor market for ten months? Perhaps the court was adopting plain-
tiff's argument concerning relative ease of proof, but that argument is
flawed. It is as easy for plaintiff to prove he received no offer as for
defendant to prove he received one-at least, if we ignore differences in
the credibility of plaintiff's witness (probably himself) and defendant's
witness (probably a third person who made the job offer). If we turn
from evidence of job offers to evidence of rejected applications, it admit-
tedly is easier for plaintiff, than for defendant, to establish how many
such applications existed. The court's point seems to be, however, that no
number of rejected applications proves with mathematical certainty that
one more application would have been futile. The point is blunt because
plaintiff need not reach that level of certainty to show he did all that was
reasonable to find re-employment.
44. Costigan v. Mohawk & H.R.R., supra note 43, at 611.
45. Id. at 616.
46. It is not true that the burden of pleading mitigation always coincides with the
burden of proving it. See McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 354-60, 169
N.E. 605, 608-10, (Cardozo, C.J., concurring), motion to amend remittitur granted, 253
N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770 (1930).
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The notion that defendant, being the wrongdoer, should have the burden
of proof on all damage issues assumes a strong punitive strand in con-
tract law. To implement the notion consistently, defendant would have
the burden on all damage issues in all kinds of contract cases, and not
just in cases where plaintiff is an employee. The case law reluctance to
cast the damage measurement burden generally on defendant, or to allow
recovery for mental anguish, or to test foreseeability at breach (rather
than contracting)-all these damage measurement doctrines suggest that
punishment and deterrence play a very minor role in contract damage
measurement policy. Fulfillment of the individual plaintiff's expectations
-more or less-has priority over the goal of securing all future promisees
from the risk of breach. Even in tort law, where deterrence is a more
prominent policy, the compensation goal has sufficient priority over the
deterrence policy that plaintiff normally has the burden of proving the
size of his damages.
By and large, the certainty rule has been applied leniently in New York,
easing the chore of carrying the burden of proof. Much-litigated problems
concerning proper evidence to establish the resale value of saved property
and the cost value of saved services are discussed subsequently4 r
Where breach occurs before the end of the contract period and counsel
disagree about the volume of sales that plaintiff would have made during
the rest of the contract period, certainty problems beset valuation of both
minuend and subtrahend, although only the certainty problems of sub-
trahend valuation concern us here. Typical cases concern requirements
contracts, commission sellers, and profit-sharing arrangements such as
business partnerships, theatrical ventures, and book publishing arrange-
ments. If there is no past performance on which the guess about future
volume can be based, the New York courts uniformly refuse recovery for
the future.4s However, when there is some history of past sales volume,
these courts usually are quick to relax the certainty requirement. 9
47. See pp. 51-52 & 66-63 infra.
48. E.g., Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N.Y. 354, 29 N.E. 255 (1S91) (theatrical venture);
Hewlett v. Caplin, 275 App. Div. 797, 8S N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st Dcp't 1949) (per curiam), aft'd,
301 N.Y. 591, 93 N.E.2d 492 (1950) (publisher to receve 10,% royalty of book not yet writ-
ten) ; Streat v. Wolf, 135 App. Div. 81, 119 N.Y. Supp. 779 (Ist Dep't 19G9) (new partner-
ship); K & R Film Co. v. Brady, 104 Misc. 667, 172 N.Y. Supp. 263 (App. T. 1918) (partirn
to share receipts from film never shown in New York but which had run in twelve other
cities).
49. E.g., Bagley v. Smith, 10 N.Y. 489 (1853) (pen manufacturing partner-hip sales);
Slater v. Kane, 275 App. Div. 648, 92 N.YS.2d 640 (1st Dep't 1949) (commisAon sales);
Hiltop Sand Corp. v. Simpson, 225 App. Div. 467, 233 N.Y. Supp. 348 (2d Dep't 1929)
(requirements contract); Brady v. Erlanger, IS8 App. Div. 728, 177 N.Y. Supp. 301 (Ist
Dep't 1919), aff'd mem., 231 N.Y. 563, 132 N.E. S$9 (1921) (vaudeville showl; Nash v.
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The two recurring slogans in these cases reveal Scylla (the plaintiff-
victim receives only nominal damages, to the delight of the breaching
party) and Charybdis (plaintiff is overcompensated when the trier of
fact accepts his outlandishly high estimate of damages). The court
cannot use conjecture or guesswork when actual proof is available to the
plaintiff to establish his loss,5" but, "when damage for a wrongful act is
proved, the fact that it is difficult to prove the exact amount of damages
will not release the wrongdoer from responsibility . . . ."I' Where the
quantity of damage sustained is obscure, but it is clear that plaintiff sus-
tained some harm, New York appellate courts are happy to approve some-
what arbitrary recoveries which, although substantial, err towards under-
compensation rather than the converse.52
D. Policies Governing Valuation
Judges rarely articulate the policies that govern their choices of valua-
tion technique, but these policies can be extrapolated from the six ab-
stract guiding principles listed earlier. It follows from the compensation
policy (of putting the plaintiff in the economic position that he would
have reached through full performance) that the value sought is always
value to the plaintiff, and never value to the defendant.
This broad principle must be immediately qualified by the implications
of the mitigation notion. The plaintiff must make a reasonable effort to
protect himself from the consequences once he learns of the breach; he
will not be permitted to recover losses caused by his own careless, waste-
ful behavior.
Thousand Island Steamboat Co., 123 App. Div. 148, 108 N.Y. Supp. 336 (4th Dep't 1908)
(sales of concessionaire on summer excursion boat). But cf. Walter Janvier, Inc. v. Baker,
229 App. Div. 679, 243 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd mem. after retrial, 235 App.
Div. 671, 255 N.Y. Supp. 906 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 259 N.Y. 604, 182 N.E. 200 (1932),
where a salesman selling defendant's product was denied recovery for lost profits because
of failure to show the stability of the volume of sales of his other products.
50. Roussos v. Christoff, 224 App. Div. 276, 277, 230 N.Y. Supp. 185, 186 (4th Dep't
1928) (per curiam); Joy Vending Co. v. S. & A. Luncheonette & Restaurant, Inc., 15
Misc. 2d 565, 567, 180 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1958).
51. Ibid. See also Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 209, 4 N.E.
264, 266 (1886).
52. In McMaster v. State, 108 N.Y. 542, 15 N.E. 417 (1888), the New York Court of
Appeals approved the action of the Board of Claims in cutting $30,000 off the estimated
lost profit of a stone supplier, which amount included (a) contingencies and accidents that
might have occurred during the remaining five years of the contract, and (b) the value to
plaintiff of breach-released overhead assets. See Mortimer v. Bristol, 190 App. Div. 452,
180 N.Y. Supp. 55 (1st Dep't 1920); Fletcher v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 41 App. Dlv. 30,
58 N.Y. Supp. 612 (4th Dep't 1899), aff'd mem., 169 N.Y. 571, 61 N.E. 1129 (1901);
Crittenden v. Johnston, 7 App. Div. 258, 40 N.Y. Supp. 87 (1st Dep't 1896).
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However, if plaintiff's post-breach behavior results in gain to him that
he would not have enjoyed but for the breach, the gain will be taken into
account. This is true even though the gain was achieved by plaintiff
taking risks above and beyond those required to meet the mitigation
policy's standard of self-protection.
These three policies, when combined, give the rule that the value of
the subtrahend will always be the higher of (1) value computed in ac-
cordance with the plaintiff's actual post-breach conduct, or (2) value
computed by reference to what a reasonable man would have done after
breach.
For example, if the plaintiff is a full-time employee of defendant and
the breach releases time that plaintiff would have devoted to defendant's
work, mitigation notions dictate that the value of the saved time is no
less than the price it would have brought if plaintiff had made reasonable
efforts to find re-employment in the same general line of work in the same
general localeY3 However, if after breach, plaintiff actually finds re-
employment in some other line of work which is more remunerative, his
receipts from that work fix the value of his saved time."
E. Abandonment and Completion Approaches
The breach by the defendant can occur at various times in the life of
the contract. If breach precedes completion of plaintiff's performance,
the question arises: Should the plaintiff complete performance in order to
resell the balance of his performance in finished form elsewhere? The
clearest example is a manufacturer of goods who learned of buyer's
repudiation before the goods were completed. If the proper response
under mitigation notions is for the plaintiff to abandon efforts to complete
and resell the rest of his performance, what he saves by virtue of breach
(the subtrahend in the single general rule) consists of the components
that would have gone into the balance of his performance. As a result, in
valuing the subtrahend, the court must total the value to plaintiff of
the raw materials, the partly finished goods and the finished goods on
hand, as well as the saved costs of completing performance. In addition,
the court must add in the value of any multi-contract ("overhead") assets
which the plaintiff was able to divert to other uses thanks to the breach.
53. See, e.g., Pindar v. Jenkins, 12S App. Div. 711, 113 N.Y. Supp. 58S (3d Dcpt 1903),
rev'd mem. on other grounds, 199 N.Y. 5S8, 93 N.E. 1129 (1910); Bigelow v. American
Forcite Powder Mfg. Co., 39 Hun 599 (N.Y. App. Div. Ist Dep't I5S6); Casper v. Naef,
80 Alisc. 492, 141 N.X. Supp. 56S (App. T. 1913); Ashkanazy v. Sachs, 110 X.Y. Supp. 929
(App. T. 190S); Costigan v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 2 Denio 609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1246); 1 Clark.
§ 30S; Annots., 72 A.L.R. 1049 (1931); 28 A.L.R. 736 (1924).
54. 1 Clark §§ 120, 307; see note 13 supra.
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This approach, based upon the cessation of further performance, I call
''components valuation."
The approach to be used where the correct course was for the manu-
facturer to complete performance and resell the goods in finished form
requires valuation of the finished goods, not the components that would
have gone into finishing them. I have called this valuation approach
"entity valuation." These two approaches are well established in New
York law, although not, of course, by these names.
If plaintiff's performance had yet to be completed at the time of
defendant's breach and if the parties disagree at trial as to whether
components or entity valuation is proper, this question becomes the
court's first order of business in fixing subtrahend value.
The issue can arise four ways: (1) after breach, plaintiff completed
all aspects of his promised performance except delivery to defendant
and, at trial, plaintiff wants entity valuation; (2) plaintiff abandoned
efforts to finish performance after breach and, at trial, he wants com-
ponents valuation; (3) after breach, plaintiff completed all aspects of
his promised performance except delivery to defendant but, at trial,
plaintiff wants components valuation; (4) plaintiff abandoned efforts
to finish performance after breach but, at trial, he wants entity valuation.
In the first two situations, where the plaintiff's choice of valuation
technique at trial corresponds to his post-breach course of action, the
court should side with the plaintiff unless (a) plaintiff should have known
at the time that he made his choice to complete or abandon performance
that his choice would enhance damages, and (b) the opposite choice
would not have entailed undue risk or self-sacrifice. In the last two
situations, the court should side with the defendant. In all four instances,
the plaintiff should have the burden of proving his post-breach conduct and
the defendant should have the burden of showing that the conduct was
not in accordance with the mitigation notion.
In three New York cases presenting the first situation (plaintiff
completed performance and wanted entity valuation), the result clearly
was as is suggested here. 5 The fourth case presenting this situation"0
requires extended discussion. Plaintiff, a jobber in steel beams, had a
contract with a German manufacturer for the purchase of 500 tons of
beams made to specifications to be furnished by defendant. Delivery was
to be made in New York. Plaintiff thereupon contracted with defendant,
55. Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 192 N.Y. 439, 85 N.E. 666 (1908); rev'd
after retrial, 148 App. Div. 546, 133 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1911), rev'd, 210 N.Y. 122, 103
N.E. 890 (1913); Hayes v. Durham, 194 App. Div. 848, 185 N.Y. Supp. 691 (3d Dep't 1921);
Funt v. Schiffman, 115 Misc. 155, 187 N.Y. Supp. 666 (App. T. 1921).
56. Isaacs v. Terry & Tench Co., 125 App. Div. 532, 109 N.Y. Supp. 792 (Ist Dep't 1908).
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who accepted 200 tons of the goods but repudiated before furnishing
specifications for the remaining 300 tons. Plaintiff did not cancel his
contract with the German supplier, but found another American pur-
chaser who sent in different specifications. This second purchaser
accepted delivery at Antwerp.
The first time that the case reached the appellate divisionr 7 plaintiff
was contending for an entity approach. He wanted the subtrahend valued
at the resale receipts from the second purchaser (apparently adjusted to
reflect saved freight and import duties). However, the appellate division
held that the subtrahend should be valued by a components approach
because the beams "contracted for were to be used in a particular build-
ing and were to be made according to specifications, which were never
furnished, and it is apparent that the plaintiff could not have had them
manufactured without the same.' -50
Apparently, the court thought that the product sold to the resale pur-
chaser differed too much in size and shape from the product that would
have been delivered to the defendant. Whatever merit such an argument
might otherwise have had, it seems groundless in view of the fact that
plaintiff and his supplier regarded the 300 tons that the resale buyer took
as the same 300 tons originally due to defendant. The court apparently
had some inkling of the weakness of its position, for it indicated later in
the opinion that any profit that plaintiff made on the resale should be
taken into account in reduction of his recovery."' There is inconsistency
here. If the resale is to be taken into account at all, this should be done
by valuing the subtrahend by the resale value of the entity. It makes no
sense to simultaneously assume that (1) plaintiff stopped work on notice
of breach (the assumption underlying a components approach), and that
(2) plaintiff completed work and resold after breach (the assumption
underlying the court's adjustment to reflect profit made on resale).
The next time that the case reached the appellate division,0' both
parties were committed to the use of a components approach and the only
difference between them concerned the components to be taken into
57. Ibid. There were three trials and five appellate decisions. Isaacs v. Terry & Tench
Co., retrial ordered, 103 N.Y. Supp. 103 (App. T. 1907), judgment of retrial aff'd, 56
Mlisc. 586, 107 N.Y. Supp. 136 (App. T. 1907), rev'd and remanded, 125 App. Div. 532, 109
N.Y. Supp. 792 (1st Dep't 1908), judgment of second retrial aff'd, 113 'N.Y. Supp. 731
(App. T. 190S), remittitur ordered, 132 App. Div. 657, 117 NX.Y. Supp. 369 (lst Dep't 1909).
58. Plaintiff sought to fix the resale value of the entity by an actual resale conducted
in a reasonable fashion.
59. 125 App. Div. at 534, 109 N.Y. Supp. at 793-94.
60. Id. at 535, 109 N.Y. Supp. at 794.
61. Isaacs v. Terry & Tench Co., 132 App. Div. 657, 117 N.Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't 1939).
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account.62 In ordering remittitur, the appellate division adhered to its
original (erroneous) formula, but made no adjustment for resale profit
because the (admittedly incomplete) record failed to show the amount
of such profit. Thus, the final result was the equivalent of components
valuation of the subtrahend despite the fact that plaintiff had completed
work after notice of the breach. At least if plaintiff had been arguing for
entity valuation, I would have used that valuation approach, since it
corresponds with the actual post-breach course of performance, and de-
fendant offered nothing to show that the post-breach course which plain-
tiff took (continuing to perform his contract with his supplier) was
commercially unreasonable.
In eleven of the twelve cases where the New York courts encountered
or discussed the second situation (plaintiff stopped work on notice of
breach and sought components valuation at trial), New York results
squared with mine. 3
The single case that the courts assumed presented the third situation
(plaintiff completes performance but seeks components valuation) was
handled compatibly with the notions in this article."4 But I am more
dubious than the court which handled the case that it presented an
instance where plaintiff completed performance after breach. Plaintiff
was the blender of "Belle of Bourbon whiskey" and defendant contracted
to buy at least 6,000 cases during the contract period. He ordered out
62. On the second retrial, the charge conformed to the prior appellate division opinion,
but the verdict was in an amount greater than the trial judge's formula would justify. The
appellate term thought that the verdict was correct and that the charge was wrong and
affirmed a judgment on the verdict. I assume that, on appeal, plaintiff tried to justify his
$1200 judgment (based on an erroneous application of components valuation), rather
than renewing his argument for a $900 recovery under an entity approach. Thus, counsel
were not at issue concerning components versus entity valuation when the case reached
the appellate division the second time.
63. Todd v. Gamble, 148 N.Y. 382, 42 N.E. 982 (1896); Baxter v. Lustberg, 205 App.
Div. 673, 200 N.Y. Supp. 125 (1st Dep't 1923); Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. McKinney, 137
App. Div. 541, 121 N.Y. Supp. 845 (3d Dep't 1910), aff'd mem., 203 N.Y. 533, 96 N.E. 1122
(1911); Kenny v. Knickerbocker Bread & Yeast Co., 136 App. Div. 568, 121 N.Y. Supp. 59
(Ist Dep't 1910); Snell v. Remington Paper Co., 102 App. Div. 138, 92 N.Y. Supp. 343
(4th Dep't 1905), aff'd mem. after retrial, 131 App. Div. 922, 115 N.Y. Supp. 1145 (4th
Dep't 1909), aff'd mem., 198 N.Y. 636, 92 N.E. 1103 (1910); Stumpf v. Merz, 50 Misc. 543,
99 N.Y. Supp. 337 (App. T. 1906); Sonneborn v. Steinan, 85 N.Y. Supp. 334 (App. T. 1903);
Graves v. Hunt, 8 N.Y. St. Rptr. 308 (App. Div. 5th Dep't 1887); Thomas v. Cauldwell, 26
N.Y. Supp. 785 (Super. Ct. 1893); J. K. Rishel Furniture Co. v. Stuyvesant Co., 123 Misc.
208, 204 N.Y. Supp. 659 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1924); Goepel v. Kurtz Action Co., 179 App. Dlv.
687, 690, 167 N.Y. Supp. 317, 319 (1917) (dictum). But see Varley v. Belford, 156 N.Y.
Supp. 597 (App. T. 1916).
64. Belle of Bourbon Co. v. Leffler, 87 App. Div. 302, 84 N.Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dep't
1903).
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only 3,500. The appellate division assumed plaintiff completed fabrication
of the product after defendant's breach, because plaintiff alleged tender
of the goods and the court could not see how they could have been
tendered unless manufactured after breach.65 However, if plaintiff was
manufacturing large batches of a fungible commodity for delivery to
others as well as defendant, and he kept a supply on hand to fill orders,
he may well have curtailed production of 1,500 cases because of breach
and still accomplished tender by offering any 1,500 cases that were in
inventory on the date of tender.
The case presents a common problem of the plaintiff who deals in
fungibles. Often it is hard for anyone to prove whether, after breach,
plaintiff "completed" fabrication (i.e., produced as many units as if there
were no breach) or "abandoned" fabrication (i.e., reduced what otherwise
would have been his volume produced).€°
In another New York case presenting the same problem, a cigarette
manufacturer recovered the difference between the contract price and the
cost of producing the cigarettes that defendant refused to accept-an
appropriate measure if components valuation was accepted.,- The court
did not state whether plaintiff, upon learning of breach, did or should
have curtailed production to this extent. I think the result in the second
case is preferable on this rationale: Where neither party seeks to show
whether the plaintiff, a manufacturer of fungibles, "completed" or
"abandoned" production of these goods, the court should presume that
he abandoned production; if, in fact, plaintiff completed and resold, it is
likely that resale of the completed goods impaired his total volume of
sales. Since the abandonment formula and the formula for completion
with adjustment for lost volume give very similar results, 3 less distortion
65. Id. at 305; 34 N.Y. Supp. at 3S7.
66. A similar problem arises if plaintiff is a publisher who agreed to run defendant's
full-page ad at no particular location in the magazine. If, after breach, plaintiff does not
run the ad, has he abandoned production of that page, or has he resold the page to
another advertiser? He was regarded as having abandoned the page in Stumpf v. Mera,
50 lisc. 543, 99 N.Y. Supp. 337 (App. T. 1906); Mendell v. Willyoung, 42 Misc. 210, 85
N.Y. Supp. 647 (App. T. 1903); 3. K. Rishel Furniture Co. v. Stuyvesant Co, 123 Misc.
203, 204 N.Y. Supp. 659 (Muic. CL N.Y. 1924). In all three cases, the courts should
have presumed that there was a proper resale of the entity. See teat accompanying notes
67 & 6S infra. Then the burden of proving the value of the saved entity would fall on
defendant See text accompanying notes 123-45 infra. And the court would reach its
(correct) result by a better rationale.
67. Kelso v. Marshall, 24 App. Div. 128, 4S N.Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't 1897). See also
J. B. Preston Co. v. Funkhouser, 235 App. Div. 200, 236 N.Y. Supp. 631 (1st Dep't 1932),
modified on other grounds, 261 N.Y. 140, 134 N.E. 737, aff'd, 290 U.S. 163 (1933) (involv-
ing a seller of slate granules which it had quarried).
63. For a discussion of where these formulae differ, see Harris, A Radical Restatement
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will result from this presumption than the converse one. In other words,
it is most likely that plaintiff-blender either reduced bourbon production
by 1,500 cases because of breach or resold the rejected 1,500 cases to a
customer who otherwise would have bought another 1,500 cases.
The sole case in which plaintiff sought entity valuation, although he
did not complete performance, was handled correctly. 0
While an occasional New York case will articulate the notions in this
article, 70 for the most part, New York judges eschew rationalizations.
Either they rest content on citation of authority"' or rely on a wholly
fallacious New York "rule" to the effect that components-valued recovery
is appropriate where there is no market for the goods in question. 72 The
supposed rule makes no sense because it is almost completely unrelated",
to the two critical inquiries: (1) did plaintiff abandon or complete fabri-
cation upon notice of breach? and (2) would a reasonable man have
abandoned or completed fabrication then? 74
The rule's diversion of attention from these two questions results in
occasional opinions which fail to make clear whether plaintiff abandoned
of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18
Stan. L. Rev. - (1965).
69. Durkee v. Mott, 8 Barb. 423 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
70. E.g., Goepel v. Kurtz Action Co., 179 App. Div. 687, 690, 167 N.Y. Supp. 317, 319
(1st Dep't 1917) (semble); Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. McKinney, 137 App. Div. 541, 121
N.Y. Supp. 845 (3d Dep't 1910), aff'd mem., 203 N.Y. 533, 96 N.E. 1122 (1911). See Funt
v. Schiffman, 115 Misc. 155, 187 N.Y. Supp. 666 (App. T. 1921), where these notions were
pursued in the teeth of (senseless) Sales Act language apparently pointing the other way.
71. E.g., Baxter v. Lustberg, 205 App. Div. 673, 200 N.Y. Supp. 125 (1st Dep't 1923);
J. K. Rishel Furniture Co. v. Stuyvesant Co., 123 Misc. 208, 204 N.Y. Supp. 659 (Munlc.
Ct. N.Y. 1924).
72. E.g., Todd v. Gamble, 148 N.Y. 382, 42 N.E. 982 (1896). Cf. Lieberman v. Templar
Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923) (semble); Snell v. Remington Paper Co.,
102 App. Div. 138, 92 N.Y. Supp. 343 (4th Dep't 1905), aff'd mem. after retrial, 131 App.
Div. 922, 115 N.Y. Supp. 1145 (4th Dep't 1909), aff'd mem., 198 N.Y. 636, 92 N.E. 1103
(1910); Belle of Bourbon Co. v. Leffler, 87 App. Div. 302, 84 N.Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dep't
1903); Thomas v. Cauldwell, 26 N.Y. Supp. 785 (Super. Ct. 1893). Even where there is
quite clearly some demand for the product, the court still finds "no market." E.g., Snell
v. Remington Paper Co., supra; Belle of Bourbon Co. v. Leffler, supra.
73. The "rule" makes sense to the extent that it prevents a plaintiff from forcing entity
valuation on an unwilling defendant in a case where plaintiff made an unreasonable decision
to complete and resell despite breach.
74. One case has another fallacious rationale for permitting a building contractor to stop
work and use components valuation. Since plaintiff's services were delegable and he could,
therefore, handle several such contracts simultaneously, he need not mitigate by resale of
the entity. Graves v. Hunt, 8 N.Y. St. Rep. 308 (App. Div. 5th Dep't 1887). His "expansibility"
has a bearing on whether or not entiy resale would impair total volume, but it does not
bear on whether he did resell, or should have resold, to another the product he otherwise
would have delivered to defendant.
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or continued work after breach.Y It would also seem to account for one
case where a court reached an erroneous result.70 In this appellate term
case, goods yet to be acquired were valued at resale value, apparently on
the assumption that all goods normally are valued at resale value without
regard to whether or not they were complete and on hand at the time of
breach.
II. COMPONENTS VALUATION
Whenever the subtrahend is being valued on the assumption that plain-
tiff should have abandoned efforts to complete his performance, the
tribunal must fix the value of every component that would have gone into
the performance if it had not been abandoned.
Usually, there will be many different components to be valued, but,
on occasion, there may be only one or two. For example, if plaintiff
is a jobber who does business by soliciting buyer orders and then arrang-
ing with suppliers to fill them, a buyer repudiation that occurs before
plaintiff made arrangements to fill buyer's order may not enable plaintiff
to save any components except the yet-to-be-ordered goods (and such
percentage of plaintiff's overhead assets as might have been released by
breach for other profitable use). If the overhead component is ignored as
trifling, the sole component may be the goods that plaintiff would have
ordered from his supplier.
From the nationwide case law, I have tried to extrapolate rules
governing the way courts go about valuing different kinds of components.
The simplest way to state my rules is to identify five mutually exclusive
categories of components, noting the appropriate valuation and burden of
proof rules for each.
The first category, "multi-contract assets, '"77 includes all components
which would have been consumed only partially in the abandoned per-
formance. For example, included in this category would be the value
of a plaintiff-manufacturer's factory and permanent labor force, to the
extent that breach released these assets for profitable re-employment.-3
75. E.g., Nason Mlfg. Co. v. Stephens, 127 N.Y. 602, 23 N.E. 411 (1891); J. B. Preston
Co. v. Funkhouser, 235 App. Div. 200, 256 N.Y. Supp. 631 (1st Dep't 1932), modified on
other grounds, 261 N.Y. 140, 184 N.E. 737, aff'd, 2n0 U.S. 163 (1933); Nev. York Over-
seas Co. v. China, Japan & South America Trading Co., 206 App. Div. 242, 20 N.Y. Supp.
449 (1st Dep't 1923); Pierson & Co. v. Nederlandsch-Indische, 203 App. Div. 365, 196 N.Y.
Supp. 537 (1st Dep't 1922).
76. Varley v. Belford, 156 N.Y. Supp. 597 (App. T. 1916), discussed in Harris, A Radical
Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results
Compared, 18 Stan. L. Rev. - (1965).
77. This category was called "saved overhead" in earlier articles.
78. It is not essential that plaintiff use an asset simultaneously on both defendant's con-
tract and another contract to put the asset into this category. If the aset would retain
1965]
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No distinction should be drawn between "on hand" and "yet to be ac-
quired" multi-contract assets.
The distinguishing mark of all components in this category is the fact
that, theoretically, precise valuation of them is almost always impossible
in the rough-and-tumble of litigation. For this reason, courts normally
adopt one of two alternative courses. Sometimes they give plaintiff the
burden of proving the value of such items, but ease the burden by accept-
ing highly imprecise evidence as sufficient to avoid nonsuit. On other
occasions, they ignore such components completely, which is the practical
equivalent of a finding that abandonment did not result in saving any
valuable components of this sort.
Either of these courses is preferable to insisting that plaintiff offer
precise proof of the resale value of his saved multi-contract assets, for
this would almost always result in limiting him to nominal damages, as
he inevitably fails to accomplish this impossible task. For reasons
elaborated in an earlier article, 79 I think that the best judicial course is
to give plaintiff the burden of proving the value of saved multi-contract
assets, but to permit him to carry the burden by evidence which, albeit
not too precise, errs in defendant's favor.
An early New York decision"° recognized the need to take this category
of component into account, but met the need in a fashion more arbitrary
than I would suggest. The lower court had reduced by a flat 30,000 dollars
a government contractor's recovery of 105,200 dollars for lost construc-
tion profits.81 The reduction, admittedly arbitrary in amount, was to allow
for saved multi-contract assets and for accidents that might have oc-
curred to reduce profits in the remaining five years of the contract's
life. The court was concerned with both the saved expense of capital,
machinery and implements yet to be acquired, and the gains that were
or should have been made when breach released the supervisory force
and the machinery on hand for other employment.82 The case conflicts
with my notions only insofar as it values these items by arbitrary fiat,
rather than crude cost accounting.
While none of the cases is articulate about the concept being employed,
that early case seemed to be using my notion of "multi-contract asset."
The critical fact was the asset's use on other contracts as well as defend-
some economic value for plaintiff at the end of plaintiff's scheduled performance for de-
fendant, the asset is an overhead item, and that portion of its value which is allotted to the
balance of plaintiff's contract is in the category of "saved overhead."
79. See Seller's Damages (Michigan) 860-65, 882-83.
80. McMaster v. State, 108 N.Y. 542, 15 N.E. 417 (1888).
81. Id. at 556; 15 N.E. at 423.
82. Id. at 556-57; 15 N.E. at 423.
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ant's, and not the fact that plaintiff would have acquired it even if he had
not contracted with defendant. Some of the other cases seem to be using
the similar, but distinct, concept of "fixed costs": costs plaintiff would
have incurred whether or not he contracted with defendant. 3 I have no
quarrel with valuing saved multi-contract assets by the portion of plain-
tiff's total fixed costs properly allocated to the unfinished portion of his
contract with defendant, but it should be recognized that this figure is
not the ultimate fact sought, but a crude approximation which errs in
defendant's favor. In the two instances where New York courts accepted
such figures as adequate to avoid nonsuit, 4 it is likely that they viewed
the figures as ultimate facts.
Because they tend to think in terms of fixed costs, not multi-contract
assets, the New York courts draw no distinction between my first and
second category of components. Cases will announce that plaintiff must
prove the saved costs of completing the contract, meaning both saved
multi-contract assets and saved (single contract) costs yet to be incurred.
In many commission salesman cases, there is no inquiry as to whether
plaintiff was selling only defendant's products or whether he sold others'
products simultaneously;"' the distinction is unimportant to the New
S3. E.g., Baird v. Mayor of the City of New York, S3 N.Y. 254 (1SSO); Devlin v. Mayor
of the City of New York, 63 N.Y. 8 (1S75); Walter Janvier, Inc. v. Baker, 229 App. Div.
679, 243 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd mem. after retrial, 235 App. Div. 671, 25S
N.Y. Supp. 906 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 259 N.Y. 604, 132 N.E. 200 (1932); Snell v. Reming-
ton Paper Co., 102 App. Div. 13S, 92 N.Y. Supp. 343 (4th Dep't 1905), aff'd mem., after
retrial, 131 App. Div. 922, 115 N.Y. Supp. 1145 (4th Dcp't 1909), aff'd mem, 193 N.Y. 636,
92 N.E. 1103 (1910). Cf. Bishop v. Autographic Register Co., 19 App. Div. 263, 46 N.Y.
Supp. 97, aff'd mem., 165 N.Y. 662, 59 N.E. 1119 (1S97). However, account was taken of
the diversion of on hand multi-contract assets in Dunn v. Allen, 55 App. Div. 637, 67 N.Y.
Supp. 218 (4th Dep't 1900); Baker Transfer Co. v. Merchants' Refrigerating & Ice Mfg. Co.,
12 App. Div. 260, 42 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1st Dep't 1896). The courts seem unaware of the
difference hetween the two concepts.
84. Walter Janvier, Inc. v. Baker, supra note 33; Snell v. Remington Paper Co., supra
note 83.
35. E.g., Baird v. Mayor of the City of New York, 83 N.Y. 254, 259 (1580); Devlin v.
Mayor of the City of New York, 63 N.Y. 5, 24-25 (1875); Wasserman v. Broadalbin Knit-
ting Co., 270 App. Div. 20, 24, 5S N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (3d Dep't 1945), aff'd mem., 296
N.Y. 815, 72 N.E.2d 11 (1947); Thomas v. Cauldwell, 26 N.Y. Supp. 755, 783 (Super. Ct.
1393). In the great mass of cases where the court simply says that plaintiff should recover
the contract price less "the cost of performance" or "the cost of manufacture," etc., it seems
likely that the court is lumping together items in my first and second categories for common
treatment. But it is possible that the court is thinking only of the second category and plans
to ignore saved multi-contract assets.
86. E.g., Slater v. Kane, 275 App. Div. 648, 92 N.YS.2d 640 (1st Dep't 1949); Prescott
v. Buffalo Fire Appliance Corp., 237 App. Div. 198, 260 N.Y. Supp. 840 (2d Dep't 1932),
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York courts because the saved selling expenses will be handled the same
way whether (in my analysis) they would be classed as multi-contract or
not.
Perhaps the most striking thing about this part of the New York case
law is the apparently random way that New York courts ignore this
category of component in some cases. In a substantial number of cases,
it is clear that multi-contract assets would have been employed in plain-
tiff's performance, and equally clear that the court is making no reduction
in recovery to reflect these assets. 7 Perhaps counsel for defendant has
made a conscious decision, not reflected in the reported opinion, to ignore
this item as de minimis. Perhaps trial judges discourage defendants from
raising the issue where the sum involved is small.88 Perhaps court and
counsel often assume nothing should be deducted on this score unless
breach enabled plaintiff to save some fixed costs-the fallacy noted
earlier. It would take a closer examination of more trial records than I
have scanned to resolve these questions.
Turning away now from multi-contract assets, there remain to be
categorized all the various components that would have been totally
consumed during the abandoned performance. These other assets must
be divided into "on hand" and "yet to be acquired" items. Items are "yet
to be acquired"--our second category-if plaintiff, at time of notice of
breach, neither had them on hand nor had obligated himself irretrievably
to acquire them. For example, if repudiation reached a plaintiff-manu-
facturer-seller before he acquired or contracted to acquire raw materials
to be used in filling defendant's order, these raw materials would be
categorized as "yet to be acquired." All "yet to be acquired" assets
should be valued at their cost of acquisition.89
The way the authors reason, from the policies that they feel should
aff'd mem., 262 N.Y. 475, 188 N.E. 27 (1933); Napier v. Spielmann, 127 App. Dlv.
711, 111 N.Y. Supp. 1009 (1st Dep't 1908).
87. E.g., Weisberg v. Art Work Shop, 226 App. Div. 532, 235 N.Y. Supp. 8 (1st Dep't),
aff'd mem., 252 N.Y. 572, 170 N.E. 147 (1929); Grant v. Abrash, 191 App. Div. 398, 181 N.Y.
Supp. 461 (1st Dep't 1920); Isaacs v. Terry & Tench Co., 132 App. Div. 657, 117 N.Y. Supp.
369 (1st Dep't 1909), reversing 113 N.Y. Supp. 731 (App. T. 1908); Carlisle v. Barnes, 102
App. Div. 573, 92 N.Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dep't 1905). See also McMaster v. State, 108 N.Y.
542, 15 N.E. 417 (1888). Examination of the record of one case reveals that counsel and
court discussed the fact that an overhead item had been included in plaintiff's computation
of the cost of performance, but the colloquy passed to other topics and there was never
another mention of how "overhead" should be handled. Record, p. 142, Thieler v. Trinity
Advertising Corp., 241 App. Div. 34, 270 N.Y. Supp. 717 (1st Dep't), aff'd mer., 265
N.Y. 668, 193 N.E. 437 (1934).
88. Cf. Wilkinson v. Davies, 146 N.Y. 25, 40 N.E. 501 (1895) (refusing to reverse for
failure to prove trifling savings of multi-contract assets.)
89. General Theory 592; Seller's Damages (Michigan) 883-84.
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govern allocation of the burden-set out earlier-to the conclusion that
the plaintiff should have the burden of proving the existence and cost
of yet-to-be-acquired assets, appears in earlier articles.
The New York cases concerning expectation damages"' consistently
value saved expenses at cost0 ' and saved on hand items at resale value. 3
Occasionally, this treatment is obscured by the way that the court de-
scribes what it is doing. For example, it may allow plaintiff his lost profit
(which is really contract price less total costs), plus the extent to which
on hand, unconsumed raw materials had a lower resale value at breach
than their cost of acquisition (which is really cost of acquisition minus
resale value) 4 Or it may allow recovery of lost profits plus costs in-
curred, to the extent that they are wasted." One case has an excellent dis-
90. General Theory 5S-92; Seller's Damages (Michigan) 8S4-85.
91. Some cases, perhaps without full consciousness of the fact, are concerned with reliance
or restitutionary formulae. E.g., France & Canada S.S. Corp. v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., 229 N.Y. 89, 127 N.E. S93 (1920); Roberts v. Wells & Co., 4 App. Div. 395, 38 N.Y.
Supp. 845 (3d Dep't 1S96). Cf. Carlin v. City of ,New York, 132 App. Div. S0, 116 N.Y.
Supp. 346 (2d Dep't 1909) ; Wieser v. Times Realty & Constr. Co., 110 N.Y. Supp. .963 (App.
T. 1908), vacated on other grounds, 131 N.Y. Supp. 337 (N.Y. City Ct. 1910); Mcylcrt v.
Gas Consumers' Benefit Co., 14 N.Y. Supp. 14S (Cir. CL 1890).
92. E.g., Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923); Long
Island Contracting & Supply Co. v. City of New York, 204 N.Y. 73, 97 N.E. 4S3 (1912);
Patterson v. Aleyerhofer, 204 N.Y. 96, 97 N.E. 472 (1912); MeMaster v. State, 103 N.Y.
542, 15 N.E. 417 (188); Wasserman v. Broadalbin Knitting Co., 270 App. Div. Z0, 53 N YX.S.
2d 597 (3d Dep't 1945), aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 815, 72 N.E.2d 11 (1947).
93. E.g., Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., supra note 92; Dillon v. Anderscn, 43 NX.Y.
231 (1870); Baxter v. Lustberg, 205 App. Div. 673, 200 N.Y. Supp. 125 ( st DCp't 1923);
Hausman v. Buchman, 189 App. Div. 597, 179 N.Y. Supp. 26 (Ist Dep't 1919); Mfeyer
Bros. Drug Co. v. McKinney, 137 App. Div. 541, 121 N.Y. Supp. 845 (3d Dep't 1910), aifd
mem., 203 N.Y. 533, 96 N.E. 1122 (1911). In one case, raw materials on hand were valued
at cost instead of resale value-a departure from my notions-but it appears that plaintiff
would have resold the goods in the same market in which he had acquired them, and that,
for most of the long period of time during which partial breaches were occurring, prices
in that market had not fluctuated since the goods were acquired. Thus, there was an error
in choice of valuation technique, but it is not clear if it led to an erroneous result. Lehmaier
v. Standard Specialty & Tube Co., 123 App. Div. 431, 103 N.Y. Supp. 402 (Ist Dep't 19SO).
See pp. 52-55 infra & cases cited note 121 infra.
94. Cf. Dillon v. Anderson, supra note 93; Baxter v. Lustberg, supra note 93; Hauwman
v. Buchman, supra note 93; Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. McKinney, supra note 93; Goldstein
v. Godfrey Co., 61 Misc. 64, 113 N.Y. Supp. 123 (App. T. 1903) (per curiam). This is the
same as giving contract price. In other words, costs yet to be incurred are being valued at
cost, and on hand materials at resale.
95. Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 149, 140 N.E. 222, 225 (1923);
Brook Iron Works, Inc. v. Cohen, 138 Misc. 416, 425, 246 N.Y. Supp. 329, 340 (Munic. CL
N.Y. 1930), rev'd per curiam, 235 App. Div. 123, 256 N.Y. Supp. 411 (2d Dep't 1931). This
means lost profit plus costs incurred reduced by the resale value of that which plaintiff ob-
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cussion of this distinction between on hand items and yet-to-be-incurred
expenses; 96 one case evidences a terrible misconception of what is going
on;" 7 the bulk of cases take the right course without discussion.
New York has not had much difficulty in categorizing items as "on
hand" or "yet to be acquired." In several cases where breach occurred
after plaintiff had contracted with a supplier for the item but before the
supplier had shipped the item, plaintiff broke his contract with his
supplier in order to mitigate damages.98 The New York courts quite
properly 9 permit plaintiff to value the item in question at cost'00 and to
recover as incidental damages any damages paid to the supplier for
breach of the supply contract.' 0 ' Similarly, the court quite properly
handled a case in which plaintiff had goods under contract, but not yet
in his possession, at the time of breach. At that moment, the resale
value of the goods vastly exceeded both the price that defendant was
to pay to plaintiff and the price that plaintiff was to pay to his supplier.
Plaintiff, shortly thereafter, entered into a joint venture whereby he
assigned two-thirds of the goods to his fellow venturer in return for
financing, the two venturers planning to ship the goods to Europe for
resale at an even higher price. The appellate division held that the goods
should be valued at their resale market value at the date of breach.02
Since plaintiff could have performed with his supplier after defendant's
breach without any risk to himself, and since his post-breach decision
to speculate on a further rise in the value of the goods can hardly be
viewed as an effort to mitigate damages, the proper valuation technique
was resale value at the time of breach-and not the cost to plaintiff of
tained by incurring these costs. Once again, it is the algebraic equivalent of the views In
this article.
96. Farrish Co. v. Harris Co., 122 Misc. 611, 204 N.Y. Supp. 638 (N.Y. City Ct. 1924).
97. Snell v. Remington Paper Co., 102 App. Div. 138, 142-45, 92 N.Y. Supp. 343, 345-48
(4th Dep't 1905), aff'd mem. after retrial, 131 App. Div. 922, 115 N.Y. Supp. 1145 (4th
Dep't 1909), aff'd mem., 198 N.Y. 636, 92 N.E. 1103 (1910) (echoing the confusion dis-
cussed at note 72 supra).
98. E.g., Hausman v. Buchman, 189 App. Div. 597, 179 N.Y. Supp. 26 (1st Dep't 1919);
Goepel v. Kurtz Action Co., 179 App. Div. 687, 167 N.Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't 1917);
Masterton v. Mayor of the City of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
99. See Seller's Damages (Michigan) 873.
100. See cases cited note 98 supra. While New York courts have had no difficulty seeing
that the unacquired items should be valued at cost, they have had rough going in deciding
how to prove cost value in this context. Doelger v. Battery Park Nat'l Bank, 201 App. Dlv.
515, 194 N.Y. Supp. 582 (1st Dep't 1922) (semble) ; see pp. 66-68 infra.
101. Masterton v. Mayor of the City of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61, 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
102. Sheldon v. Argos Mercantile Corp., 194 App. Div. 472, 478-81, 185 N.Y. Supp. 513,
517-20 (1st Dep't 1920), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 585, 135 N.E. 928 (1922).
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acquiring the goods from his supplier or the return to plaintiff from his
joint venture (which turned out badly).1o3
Components which are neither "multi-contract" nor "yet to be ac-
quired" must be further subdivided into three groups. Non-delegable
personal services04 must be singled out because they are the only class
of components as to which defendant should have the burden of proving
saved value. The author's rationale appears elsewhere;' : it may suffice
for now to mention (1) the probability (at least where the employee is
the head of a household) that the employee will use reasonable efforts
to find re-employment when wrongfully discharged; (2) the great
difficulty faced by whoever has the burden in cases where plaintiff did
not in fact resell all his breach-released time;" ' (3) the likelihood that
the employer is in the better position to distribute any loss sustained;
(4) the employee's lack of any expectation-vindicating remedy alterna-
tive to damages; and (5) the relative hardship, on the one hand, of
overcompensating plaintiff slightly and, on the other hand, of depriving
plaintiff of all recovery whatsoever in cases where the burden can be
carried as regards most, but not all, of the time period from breach to
the end of the contract term.117 In cases involving sellers of personal
services who work for a great many employers at once (such as many
lawyers), it is often impossible to identify the precise blocks of time
freed by breach for resale to other employers; this means that the party
with the burden of proof is doomed to fail to carry it, and allocation of
the burden is tantamount of choosing between a defendant's verdict
and valuing the subtrahend at zero. 08
103. I would value the goods at plaintiffs return from the venture if (a) he could not
have entered the venture but for defendant's breach, and (b) the return was greater than
thb good's resale value at the time of breach, and (c) plaintiff contributed nothing to the
venture but these goods.
104. General Theory 605-06; Seller's Damages (Mlichigan) SSS-90.
105. Id. at 860-64, SS2-86, SS9-90.
106. The unsold time cannot be valued by hypothetical eruale value becaume of the live
possibility that there may be absolutely no demand for it, except at sacrifice prices, during
a substantial part of the remaining contract term. Nor can it be valued, as wheat or coal
are, by reference to what other buyers recently paid or bid for identical items at a com-
modity exchange. About the only persuasive evidence is what other buyers bid for this time
when plaintiff solicited their bids after defendant's breach. If plaintiff failed to solict such
bids when he learned of the breach, or if he failed to locate a buyer sufficiently intercsted to
bid, it may be impossible for either party to prove the subtrahend's value.
107. This problem only becomes acute if the contract cannot be regarded as "divisible"
by months or weeks or days or hours.
10. See Carlisle v. Barnes, 102 App. Div. 573, 580-31, 92 N.Y. Supp. 917, 922-23 (1st
Dep't 1905), appeal dismissed, 183 N.Y. 567 (1906) (awarding such a plaintiff-attorney the
price, undiminished by the value of his saved time); cf. Weisberg v. Art Work Shop, 226
1965]
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The New York appellate courts reach results that are consistently
correct, suggesting at least an intuitive appreciation of the line between
non-delegable services and other categories of components. Defendant
has the burden of proving the saved value of non-delegable services,
°D
whereas plaintiff has the burden of proving the value of other classes
of components."' Trial judges have had considerable difficulty learning
that the distinction lies between non-delegable services and all other
categories of saved components; in ten cases, they have been reversed
for allowing a seller of delegable services to recover the price un-
diminished by the value of saved costs."' Apparently, many trial judges
were trying to apply an erroneous parochial rule which would give to all
sellers of services, prima facie, the unpaid balance of the price, ignoring
the fact that this would give the defendants in such cases the burden
on all categories of saved components.1 1 2
App. Div. 532, 235 N.Y. Supp. 8 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 252 N.Y. 572, 170 N.E. 147 (1929)
(engineers).
109. Engel v. Mutual Garment Co., 166 N.Y. Supp. 981 (App. T. 1917); see Casper v.
Naef, 80 Misc. 492, 141 N.Y. Supp. 568 (App. T. 1913); pp. 52-55 & cases cited note 128
infra; cf. Brockhurst v. Ryan, 2 Misc. 2d 747, 146 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
110. Costs yet to be incurred: Danolds v. State, 89 N.Y. 36 (1882) ; Walter Janvier, Inc.
v. Baker, 229 App. Div. 679, 243 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd mem, after retrial,
235 App. Div. 671, 255 N.Y. Supp. 906 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 259 N.Y. 604, 182 N.E. 200
(1932); Hausman v. Buchman, 189 App. Div. 597, 179 N.Y. Supp. 26 (1st Dep't 1919).
Leasehold on hand: Dickerson v. Menschel, 188 App. Div. 547, 177 N.Y. Supp. 376 (1st
Dep't 1919); Goepel v. Kurtz Action Co., 179 App. Div. 687, 167 N.Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't
1917). Personalty on hand: Beckwith v. City of New York, 121 App. Div. 462, 106 N.Y.
Supp. 175 (2d Dep't 1907), aff'd mem., 210 N.Y. 530 (1913); Miller v. Hahn, 23 App. Dlv.
48, 48 N.Y. Supp. 346 (2d Dep't 1897). See cases cited notes 111 & 129 & pp. 52-55 infra.
111. Grant v. Abrash, 191 App. Div. 398, 181 N.Y. Supp. 461 (1st Dep't 1920); Bishop v.
Autographic Register Co., 19 App. Div. 268, 46 N.Y. Supp. 97 (1st Dep't 1897), aff'd mem.,
165 N.Y. 662, 59 N.E. 1119 (1901); Baker Transfer Co. v. Merchants' Refrigerating & Ice
Mfg. Co., 12 App. Div. 260, 42 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1st Dep't 1896) ; Manhattan Carting Co. v.
Keen's English Chop House, Inc., 180 N.Y. Supp. 409 (App. T. 1920); Engel v. Mutual Gar-
ment Co., 166 N.Y. Supp. 981 (App. T. 1917); Casper v. Naef, 80 Misc. 492, 141 N.Y. Supp.
568 (App. T. 1913) ; Goldstein v. Godfrey Co., 61 Misc. 64, 113 N.Y. Supp. 123 (App. T. 1908)
(per curiam); Kennelly v. Walker, 107 N.Y. Supp. 95 (App. T. 1907); Rosenbloom v. Maas,
97 N.Y. Supp. 210 (App. T. 1905); Finck v. Menke, 31 Misc. 748, 64 N.Y. Supp. 38 (App.
T. 1900) rev'd per curiam, 33 Misc. 769, 67 N.Y. Supp. 954 (App. T. 1901); cf. Graves v.
Hunt, 8 N.Y. St. Rptr. 308 (App. Div. 5th Dep't 1887); Durkee v. Mott, 8 Barb. 423
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850), which reflect similar confusion.
112. See J. K. Rishel Furniture Co. v. Stuyvesant Co., 123 Misc. 208, 204 N.Y. Supp.
659 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1924), where one trial judge makes it apparent that he thought
the distinction was between a contract "for personal services" and one "for goods bargained
and sold." In Sackman v. Stephenson, 11 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1939), the trial court
erroneously gave to a correspondence school the price undiminished by the value of saved
services and materials; no appeal was taken. Cf. Haughey v. Belmont Quadrangle Drilling
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The remaining components consist of various kinds of property, all
of which were on hand at the time of breach and all of which would be
fully consumed" 3 by plaintiff's full performance of this contract. These
components need to be divided into two categories only when one ques-
tion arises: May the plaintiff prove the value of the property by expert
evidence of what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller? Such evi-
dence should be permitted if (a) the property is so unique that it is
not feasible to value it by reference to what has been offered or paid
recently for virtually identical property; and (b) the property is of a
sort for which there is almost always some demand, albeit units often
sell slowly unless reduced to sacrifice prices; and (c) the property will
not perish in a fairly short time. The first condition, of course, establishes
the necessity for departing from the more conventional proofs of resale
value. The second eliminates instances where the property is not just
slow-moving, but utterly without demand. The last condition can be
illustrated by a hypothetical situation in which a bailee repudiates his con-
tract two months before the end of the term, thereby enabling the bailor to
try to re-let the unique chattel for this two month period. Assume further
that the bailor did not, in fact, succeed in finding a new bailee during
that two month period and that it was unlikely that a new bailee for
such a chattel at conventional rates could be found within a month. In
these circumstances, it would be unfair to plaintiff to value his savings
at what a hypothetical willing bailee would pay a hypothetical willing
bailor for two months' use of this chattel.1  Elsewhere, I have called
the category where hypothetical resale valuation is proper "realty on
hand," and the residual category "personalty on hand.""' The New
York results are consistent with these ideas. I have found no case
patently applying hypothetical resale value to personalty on hand, and
Corp., 284 N.Y. 136, 29 N.E.2d 649 (1940), motion to amend remittitur granted, 2E6 N.1.
584, 35 N.E.2d 931 (1941), where the court of appeals allocated the burden correctly, but
saw the distinction as being between employment contracts and sale of goods contracts.
113. That is to say, it would no longer be plaintiff's. He would transfer it or consume it
physically in the course of performing.
114. The same thing is true if realty, not personalty, is involved. But it rarely aries in
this context because the lessor usually can sue for the price, a superior remedy to expzctation
damages from his point of view, since it does not require him to mitigate by re-letting.
Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876); Sancourt Realty Corp. v. Dowling, 220 App. Div. 6 0,
222 N.Y. Supp. 28S (1st Dep't 1927); Railway Advertising Co. v. Standard Roc: Candy
Co., 83 App. Div. 191, 83 N.Y. Supp. 33S (2d Dep't 1903), aff'd mem., 178 N.Y. 570, 70 N.E.
1108 (1904) (same rule where plaintiff leases advertising space in railroad cars); cf.
Manhattan Realty Appraisers v. Marchbank, 87 Misc. 336, 339, 149 N.Y. Supp. 834, 836
(App. T. 1914) (dictum). But a lessor of rooms must re-let. Wilson v. Martin, 1 Denio C92
(N.. Sup. Ct. 1845).
115. Seller's Damages (Michigan) 374, 885-88.
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one of the two cases involving realty on hand appears to approve hypo-
thetical valuation."8
While the resale value of on hand personalty cannot be established
by expert testimony about the conduct of a hypothetical willing buyer,
it can be shown by evidence of the actual receipts of a post-breach re-
sale, if the resale was timed and conducted to fetch the highest price
feasible 17 and any relevant statutory requirements"" were met. And, in
the absence of such a resale, plaintiff can still prove resale value, but
the reported cases do not make clear the kinds of evidence used in the
successful" and unsuccessful cases.1 20
III. ENTITY VALUATION
This approach is appropriate wherever plaintiff reasonably resold or
should have resold to another buyer substantially the same finished
product 121 which, but for breach, he would have delivered to defend-
ant. As a practical matter, this embraces four kinds of cases: (1)
plaintiff's sole unrendered performance at the time of breach was
116. Dickerson v. Menschel, 188 App. Div. 547, 556, 177 N.Y. Supp. 376, 381 (1st
Dep't 1919). The case involved a twenty-one year lease. I have found no case dealing
with the problem of valuing short-term leases or perishable goods that are not in immediate
demand. See cases cited note 127 & pp. 52-55 infra.
117. Baxter v. Lustberg, 205 App. Div. 673, 200 N.Y. Supp. 125 (1st Dep't 1923);
Hausman v. Buchman, 189 App. Div. 597, 179 N.Y. Supp. 26 (1st Dep't 1919); see Fox v.
Woods, 96 N.Y. Supp. 117 (App. T. 1905) (actual receipts used to fix resale value of
realty); cases cited notes 130 & 131 & pp. 52-55 infra; cf. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v.
McKinney, 137 App. Div. 541, 121 N.Y. Supp. 845 (3d Dep't 1910), aff'd mem., 203 N.Y. 533,
96 N.E. 1122 (1911), where the court does not mention whether plaintiff proved the reason-
ableness of his resale.
118. See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 141 (repealed by N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102). This material
is now covered in N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-706.
119. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. McKinney, 137 App. Div. 541, 121 N.Y. Supp. 845 (3d
Dep't 1910), aff'd mem., 203 N.Y. 533, 96 N.E. 1122 (1911); Masterton v. Mayor of the City
of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Thomas v. Cauldwell, 26 N.Y. Supp. 785
(Super. Ct. 1893) (scrap value).
120. Beckwith v. City of New York, 121 App. Div. 462, 106 N.Y. Supp. 175 (2d Dep't
1907), aff'd mem., 210 N.Y. 530 (1913), where plaintiff failed to establish that on-hand
plumbing parts had only scrap value but persuaded the court that their resale value was
less than their cost of acquisition; they were valued, therefore, at cost to him.
121. Sometimes the entity resold varies slightly from the entity that defendant would
have received. E.g., Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 192 N.Y. 439, 85 N.E. 666
(1908), rev'd after retrial, 148 App. Div. 546, 133 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1911), rev'd,
210 N.Y. 122, 103 N.E. 890 (1913) (advertising space with ad touting the wares of the
party renting the space); Ashburner v. Balchen, 7 N.Y. 262 (1852) (cargo space aboard
plaintiff's vessel); Mann v. National Linseed Oil Co., 87 Hun 558, 34 N.Y. Supp.
481 (5th Dep't 1895) (linseed oil for resale purchaser); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Lyncroft Grain
Corp., 8 Misc. 2d 521, 166 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (cargo space aboard
plaintiff's vessel).
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delivery of his own non-delegable services;1 -2 (2) plaintiff's sole un-
rendered performance at the time of breach was delivery of property,
and the undelivered property was on hand in completed form when
breach occurred;' (3) the contract called for delivery of property, and
although some or all of the property was neither delivered nor on hand
in finished form at the time of breach, plaintiff reasonably did take or
should have taken post-breach steps to resell the property in finished
form to another buyer;" and (4) the contract called for delivery of
delegable services, and although some or all such services were un-
delivered at breach, plaintiff did take or should have taken post-breach
steps to resell such services to another buyer.12
122. E.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Bills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. C0S, motion to
amend remittitur granted, 253 N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770 (1930); Fuchs v. Koerner, 107 N.Y.
529, 14 N.E. 445 (1S7); Everson v. Powers, S9 N.Y. 527 (1S2); Hovard v. Daly, 61
N.Y. 362 (1875); Weisberg v. Art Work Shop, 226 App. Div. 532, 235 N.Y. Supp. 8 (1st
Dep't), afi'd mem., 252 N.Y. 572, 170 N.E. 147 (1929). In most of these cases, I suspect
that some share of plaintiff's multi-contract assets were saved, too, but this phenomenon
was ignored uniformly in the opinions.
123. Goods: e.g., Ruttonjee v. Frame, 237 N.Y. 115, 142 N.E. 437 (1923) (per curiam);
Fulton v. Canno, 222 N.Y. 139, 118 N.E. 633 (191S); Moore v. Potter, 155 N.Y. 4S1, 50 N.E.
271 (19); Riendeau v. Bullock, 147 N.Y. 269, 41 N.E. 561 (1S95). Realty: e.g., Levy v. 315
W. 79th St. Corp., 222 App. Div. 9, 225 N.Y. Supp. 21S (Ist Dep't 1927); Acidey v.
Parsons, 190 App. Div. 762, 181 N.Y. Supp. 116 (3d Dep't 1920); Hayden v. Pinchot, 172
App. Div. 102, 15S N.Y. Supp. 215 (1st Dep't 1916); Kuntz v. Schnugg, 99 App. Div. 191,
90 NAT. Supp. 933 (1st Dep't 1904). Going business: e.g., Roussos v. Christoff, 224 App.
Div. 276, 230 N.Y. Supp. 185 (4th Dep't 1928) (per curiam); Kingston Braid Mills, Inc. ,.
Aboff, 179 N.Y. Supp. 127 (App. T. 1919); Perlman v. Levy, 109 N.Y. Supp. 785 (App. T.
190S); Sutcliffe v. Potts, 8S N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 277 App. Div. 751,
97 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1st Dep't 1950). Other: e.g., Van Brocklen v. Smeallie, 140 N.Y. 70, 35 N.E.
415 (1S93) (one-third of partnership); Baer v. Durham Duplex Razor Co., 223 App. Div.
350, 239 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 570, 173 N.E. 871 ('1930)
(patent); Wyllys Co. v. Nixon, 165 App. Div. 373, 1.0 N.Y. Supp. 944 (1st DZp't 1914),
rev'd sub nom. Phelps-Stokes Estates Inc. v. Nixon, 222 N.Y. 93, 113 N.E. 241 (1917)
(stock); Pardee v. Douglas, 122 App. Div. 395, 106 N.Y. Supp. 775 (2d Dep't 1907)
(stock); rflson v. Martin, 1 Denio 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 145) (room in rooming house).
124. E.g., Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 192 N.Y. 439, 85 N.E. 6G6 (10S),
rev'd after retrial, 148 App. Div. 546, 133 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1911), revd 210 N.Y. 122,
103 N.E. 890 (1913); Hayes v. Durham, 194 App. Div. 84, IS N.Y. Supp. 691 (3d Dept
1921); Belle of Bourbon Co. v. Leffler, 37 App. Div. 302, 34 N.Y. Supp. 35 (1st Dep't
1903); Fletcher v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 41 App. Div. 30, 53 X.Y. Supp. 612 (4th Dep't
1899), aff'd mem., 169 N.Y. 571, 61 N.E. 1135 (1901); Funt v. Schiffman, 11S Misc. 155,
187 N.Y. Supp. 666 (App. T. 1921).
125. E.g., Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., supra note 124, ,here plaintiff
published a monthly journal and was to run defendant's ad in it on a desgnated page, plain-
tiff should have resold the space; Ashburner v. Balchen, 7 N.Y. 262 (1852), where plaintiff
resold the cargo space on the vessel that defendant was to fill; Isbrandtssr Co. v. Lyncroft
Grain Corp., 8 Misc. 2d 521, 166 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (same); Hc&!"cher v.
MlcCrea, 24 Wend. 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840), where plaintiff should have resold ouch carvgo
space; Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1339) (same).
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In the first two kinds of cases, there was but a single component to
be used in performing the balance of the contract. One could view these
cases as involving component valuation, rather than entity valuation,
and the result would be the same. In the last two kinds of cases, there
is real significance to the use of entity, instead of components, valuation.
The four classes of cases share this common trait: The court should
value plaintiff's saved performance in its finished jorm.
Appropriate proof burden and valuation rules parallel those dis-
cussed earlier: (1) the saved entity should be valued at resale, not at
cost;"' (2) only if the saved entity consists solely or almost entirely
of "on hand realty" should the court accept evidence of what a hypo-
thetical willing buyer would pay for it; 127 (3) if the saved entity con-
I am puzzled why publishers who sell space on a designated page must resell the entity
(e.g., Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., supra note 124), whereas those
selling ads without a fixed location need not (e.g., Stumpf v. Merz, 50 Misc. 543, 99 N.Y.
Supp. 337 (App. T. 1906); Mendell v. Willyoung, 42 Misc. 210, 85 N.Y. Supp. 647 (App. T.
1903); J. K. Rishel Furniture Co. v. Stuyvesant Co., 123 Misc. 208, 204 N.Y. Supp. 659
(Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1924)). I am puzzled, too, why the maritime carrier must resell the
entity (e.g., Ashburner, Heckscher, Shannon, and Isbrandtsen cases, supra), but the rafter
of logs and the deliveryman ashore need not (e.g., Baker Transfer Co. v. Merchants' Re-
frigerating & Ice Mfg. Co., 12 App. Div. 260, 42 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1st Dep't 1896); Durkee
v. Mott, 8 Barb. 423 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850)). Indeed, despite the great number of New York
cases involving builders and manufacturers, I find no other case in which the seller of
delegable services is required to mitigate by resale of the entity. See, e.g., Graves v. Hunt,
8 N.Y. St. Rptr. 308 (App. Div. 5th Dep't 1887) (builder need not resell the entity).
Perhaps the courts have trouble visualizing the entity in cases which do not involve
designated space on a particular page or vessel. Perhaps the courts are grappling In the
dark with the lost volume problem. See pp. 59-69 infra. Undoubtedly, they are reluctant to
make plaintiff stay in business and risk his capital in situations where he is considering
abandoning the enterprise. Conceding all this, it is hard to see why the seller of "room and
board" need not resell the entity. E.g., Lydecker v. Valentine, 71 Hun 194, 24 N.Y. Supp.
567 (2d Dep't 1893); Wetmore v. Jaffray, 9 Hun 140 (2d Dep't 1876), aff'd, 73 NY.
218 (1878); Wilkinson v. Davies, 146 N.Y. 25, 40 N.E. 501 (1895) (dictum). And
why the person selling only rooms, and not board, apparently must resell the entity. E.g.,
Wilson v. Martin, 1 Denio 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845). But perhaps mitigation does not
require one to enter into a relationship as intimate as that with a roomer-boarder. The
feeling remains that mitigation notions and the use of entity valuation are underdeveloped
in this class of cases where plaintiff sells fairly fungible units of delegable services.
126. E.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N:E. 605, motion to
amend remittitur granted, 253 N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770 (1930); Ruttonjee v. Frame, 237
N.Y. 115, 142 N.E. 437 (1923) (per curiam); Fulton v. Canno, 222 N.Y. 189, 118 N.E. 633
(1918) ; Milage v. Woodward, 186 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E. 873 (1906) ; Moore v. Potter, 155 N.Y.
481, 50 N.E. 271 (1898).
127. Although it is not perfectly clear how the entity should have been valued, hypo-
thetical resale value apparently was approved in the following cases where the entity was
land or a going business: e.g., Roussos v. Christoff, 224 App. Div. 276, 230 N.Y. Supp. 185
(4th Dep't 1928) (per curiam); Levy v. 315 W. 79th St. Corp., 222 App. Div. 9, 225 N.Y.
Supp. 218 (1st Dep't 1927) ; Hayden v. Pinchot, 172 App. Div. 102, 158 N.Y. Supp. 215 (1st
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sists solely or almost entirely of non-delegable services, defendant should
have the burden of proving its value; 11 (4) otherwise, plaintiff should
have the burden.aYO Where resale value is sought, the receipts of an
actual resale establish resale value' 30 if plaintiff proves the fairness of
the resale'3 ' and plaintiff did not elect some inconsistent remedy earlier. "
Dep't 1916); Kuntz v. Schnugg, 99 App. Div. 191, 90 N.Y. Supp. 933 (Ist Dep't 1904). I
found no effort to use hypothetical resale value in a case involving some other kind of entity.
128. E.g., Milage v. Woodward, 1S6 N.Y. 252, 73 N.E. 373 (1906); Fuchs v. Koerner,
107 N.Y. 529, 14 N.E. 445 (1887) (semble); Everson v. Powers, 89 N.Y. 527 (1892)
(semble); Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362 (1875); Weisberg v. Art Work Shop, 226 App. Div.
532, 533, 235 N.Y. Supp. 5, 10 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 252 N.Y. 572, 170 N.E. 147 (1929)
(semble). In only one case was there a close question as to whether the non-delegable
services constituted a large enough part of the entity to give defendant the burden of
proving the entity's value. Milage v. Woodward, supra, where defendant was given the
burden of proving the resale value of the entity---carrer services aboard plaintiff's canal
boat.
129. Goods: e.g., Gahen v. Platt, 69 N.Y. 34S (177); Derami, Inc. v. John B. Cabot,
Inc., 273 App. Div. 717, 79 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1943); Belle of Bourbon Co. v.
Leffier, S7 App. Div. 302, 84 N.Y. Supp. 385 (Ist Dep't 1903); National Cash Register Co.
v. Schmidt, 48 App. Div. 472, 62 N.Y. Supp. 952 (2d Dep't 1900); Babbitt v. Widez Motor
Sales Corp., 17 Misc. 2d SS9, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. T. 1959) (per curiam); see Watts v.
Phillips-Jones Corp., 211 App. Div. 523, 207 N.Y. Supp. 493 (1925), affdd mmer., 242 N.Y.
557, 152 N.E. 425 (1926); Case v. Simonds, 7 N.Y. Supp. 253 (App. Div. 5th Dep't 18S9);
Farrish Co. v. Harris Co., 122 Misc. 611, 204 N.Y. Supp. 638 (N.Y. City Ct. 1924). Realty:
e.g., Kingston Braid Mills, Inc. v. Aboff, 179 N.Y. Supp. 127 (App. T. 1919); Perlman v.
Levy, 109 N.Y. Supp. 785 (App. T. 190); ilson v. Holden, 16 Abb. Pr. 133 (N.Y. App. T.
1863); see Levy v. 315 W. 79th St. Corp., 222 App. Div. 9, 225 N.Y. Supp. 213 (1st Dcp't
1927); Keitel v. Zimmermann, 19 Misc. 581, 43 N.Y. Supp. 676 (Sup. Ct. 197); Gull v.
West, 65 Hun 1, 19 N.Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dep't 1892). Going business: e.g., Roussos v. Chris-
toff, 224 App. Div. 276, 230 N.Y. Supp. 185 (4th Dep't 1928) (per curiam). Stock: fce Pardee
v. Douglas, 122 App. Div. 395, 106 N.Y. Supp. 775 (2d Dep't 1907); Wyllys Co. v. Ni'xon,
165 App. Div. 373, 150 N.Y. Supp. 944 (1st Dep't 1914), rev'd on other grounds !ub norm.
Phelps-Stokes Estates, Inc. v. Nixon, 222 N.Y. 93, 118 N.E. 241 (1917). But see Ware Bro.
v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 192 N.Y. 439, 85 N.E. 666 (1903), rev'd after retrial, 148
App. Div. 546, 133 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1911), rev'd, 210 N.Y. 122, 103 N.E. &I0 11913).
130. Smith v. Pettee, 70 N.Y. 13 (1877); Lewis v. Greider, 51 N.Y. 231 (1S72);
Dustan v. McAndrew, 44 N.Y. 72 (1870); Pollen v. Le Roy, 30 N.Y. 549 (1863); Hyman
v. Huilman, 205 App. Div. 119, 199 N.Y. Supp. 366 (1st Dep't 1923); Hubbard v.
Rockaway Lunch Co., 131 Misc. 53, 225 N.Y. Supp. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Kingston Braid
Mills, Inc. v. Aboff, 179 N.Y. Supp. 127, 129 (App. T. 1919) (dictum).
131. Plaintiff failed to establish this in the following cases: Derami, Inc. v. John B.
Cabot, Inc., 273 App. Div. 717, 79 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1948); Guli v. West, 65 Hun 1,
19 N.Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dep't 1892); Case v. Simonds, 7 N.Y. Supp. 253 (App. Div. 5th
Dep't 1889); Worcester Bleach & Dye Works Co. v. Dlugasch, 181 N.Y. Supp. 44 (App. T.
1920); Perlman v. Levy, 109 N.Y. Supp. 785 (App. T. 190); Wilson v. Holden, 16 Abb. Pr.
133 (N.Y. App. T. 1st Dep't 1863); Keitel v. Zimmermann, 19 Misc. 581, 43 NX.Y.
Supp. 676 (Sup. Ct. 1897); Farrish Co. v. Harris Co., 122 Misc. 611, :04 N.Y. Supp. 638
(N.Y. City Ct. 1924); Chozo Yano v. Ledman, 183 N.Y. Supp. 764 (N.Y. City Ct. 1921),
rev'd on other grounds, 192 N.Y. Supp. 647 (App. T. 1922).
132. Gray v. Central R.R., 82 Hun 523, 31 N.Y. Supp. 704 (1st Dep't 1&94), afftd, 157
N.Y. 483, 52 N.E. 555 (1899).
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In a case which reaches a result inconsistent with these notions, plain-
tiff, a publisher of a monthly trade journal, had agreed to set up
defendant's ad and to run it for twelve issues in a designated place
opposite the back cover.13 The repudiation occurred after plaintiff had
set up the ad but before it had appeared. At least on retrial (and per-
haps at the first trial, too), it was shown that plaintiff found it cheaper
to run defendant's ad after the repudiation than to take it out, and
plaintiff in fact ran the ad for twelve months after repudiation, during
which time his advertising salesmen were told to try to resell this partic-
ular space to another advertiser. It was not shown whether plaintiff
ever received any offer from any advertiser seeking to buy this space.
At the first trial, plaintiff sought to recover the price on the theory
that he had fully performed. The trial judge dismissed the complaint,
but the court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. 3 ' In the
court's view, plaintiff could not sue for the price since mitigation pre-
vented him from completing performance after notice of repudiation.
His remedy was damages, and the subtrahend should be valued as in
cases involving "the ordinary employment of servants for specified terms
.... ": .. (1) it should not be valued at cost; and (2) defendant should
have the burden of proving its value.13 While aware of these two respects
in which employment cases differed from cases involving anticipatory
repudiation of a contract to buy goods to be manufactured, the court
seemed unaware of a third distinction-the employment cases involve
entity valuation whereas the manufacturing cases involve components
valuation. However, in rejecting defendant's efforts to analogize the case
to those involving manufacture, the court was rejecting, perhaps un-
wittingly, a components approach to subtrahend valuationY.17
In my judgment, the court's inadvertent selection of entity valuation
was correct. Plaintiff, after notice of breach, had not abandoned efforts
to complete and resell the entity-the space on the page facing the
back cover.18 Abandonment of the effort would have entailed abandon-
133. Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 192 N.Y. 439, 85 N.E. 666 (1908),
rev'd after retrial, 148 App. Div. 546, 133 N.Y. Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1911), rev'd, 210 N.Y.
122, 103 N.E. 890 (1913).
134. Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 192 N.Y. 439, 85 N.E. 666 (1908).
135. Id. at 442, 85 N.E. at 666.
136. Id. at 443, 85 N.E. at 666.
137. The appellate court opinions after the case was retried clearly assumed that entity
valuation was proper and addressed only the question: Who has the burden of proving the
entity's value? Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 148 App. Div. 546, 133 N.Y.
Supp. 60 (3d Dep't 1911), rev'd, 210 N.Y. 122, 103 N.E. 890 (1913).
138. Of course, the entity resold would differ in one respect from the entity that
defendant contracted for-the printed matter appearing in the space would be altered to
tout the resale purchaser's wares, not defendant's.
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ment of publication of the magazine itself."ia Plaintiff's decision to
continue publishing despite the loss of one advertiser was commercially
sound,40 even though he never succeeded in reselling this space during
the term of the contract.
On retrial, plaintiff recovered damages measured by the price, defend-
ant having failed to offer evidence of the resale value of the saved space.
The court of appeals approved this result,14' and reversed the appellate
division, which had thought that the burden of proof should rest on
plaintiff." Thus, the earlier court of appeals held that defendant had the
burden of proving the resale value of the entity in this case. The closest
the court came to a rationale was the analogy it thought it saw between
this case and one involving "the ordinary employment of servants for
specified terms ....
Four of the reasons why defendant should have the burden of proving
the value of saved non-delegable services are present in this case:
(1) the probability that plaintiff will, after breach, make reasonable
efforts to resell the entity, so that any failure to resell reflects lack of
demand rather than lack of selling effort; (2) the plaintiff's lack of
any alternative expectation-vindicating remedy, such as specific per-
formance, or the price; (3) the relative hardship, on the one hand, of
overcompensating plaintiff slightly and, on the other hand, of depriving
him of all recovery whatsoever in cases where the burden can be carried
as regards most, but not all, of the time period from breach to the end
of the contract period; and (4) the live possibility that there may be
absolutely no demand for the entity during a substantial part of its
remaining life history-thus precluding its valuation by hypothetical
resale value. However, the fifth reason why defendant should have the
burden in employee cases-the probability that the plaintiff is a worse
risk distributor than the defendant-is not applicable3 44 I have taken the
139. Since plaintiff was to produce this page as well as print certain matter on it,
abandonment would involve more than publishing the journal with this page left blank.
140. His decision to run the ad, rather than leave the space blank, would snem sound,
too, since it was expensive to alter the page once it was set up.
141. Wkare Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 210 N.Y. 122, 103 N.E. 130 (1913).
142. Ware Bros. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 14S App. Div. 546, 133 N.Y. Supp.
60 (3d Dep't 1911).
143. 192 N.Y. at 442, S5 N.. at 666. The court thought that it saw a factual -imilarity
between this case, where plaintiff's abandonment would have saved only trivial amounts
of ink and paper and a substantial amount of "services," and cases where abandonment
would save only plaintiff's non-delegable services. Apart from the fact that it was com-
paring an entity with several components, the court seems misaligned in confusing non-
delegable services with the various multi-contract assets involved here-all subsumed under
the term "services." In contrast, one case clearly perceived the difference that the court of
appeals overlooked. Simon v. Levinson, 126 N.Y. Supp. 659 (App. T. 1911).
144. See p. 49 supra.
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position previously that plaintiff should have the burden of proof unless
the entity consists of non-delegable services 4 -i.e., unless all five reasons
for putting the burden on defendant coincide. Now, having encountered
this case, I suspect I should have qualified my statement more. Perhaps
it should read: "unless the entity consists of non-delegable services or
the policy reasons for giving defendant the burden are substantially as
strong as in situations where non-delegable services are involved."
IV. MINOR VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS AND INCIDENTAL DAMAGES
We are not concerned here with the proper time or place of resale
valuation, but will pause to note the way that the entity's gross resale
value must be adjusted to give accurate damage measurement. Under-
standing this is the key to understanding the lost volume phenomenon,
to be discussed shortly.
The adjustments to resale valuation can be illustrated with a case in
which plaintiff agreed to sell defendant a machine for 2,000 dollars
delivered to defendant's place of business. Breach occurred when the
goods were on hand and ready for delivery but before plaintiff incurred
the 25 dollars that he would have spent to deliver them to defendant.
Plaintiff, after the breach, contracted to sell X this machine for 1,950
dollars delivered at X's place of business. It cost plaintiff 35 dollars to
deliver the goods to X's place of business. It is clear that damages are
not measured accurately if the minuend is set at 2,000 dollars and the
subtrahend at 1,950 dollars and plaintiff recovers 50 dollars. He should
get 10 dollars more.
This can be accomplished by either of two ways. First, the court
could make the subtrahend 1,975 dollars (not 1,950 dollars) and could
put a 35 dollar item in "incidental damages."' 46 Or the court could put
nothing in "incidental damages" and treat the subtrahend as 1,940 dollars
-the gross resale value of 1,950 dollars adjusted downward by 10
145. Seller's Damages (Michigan) 903.
146. Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N.Y. 469, 21 N.E. 1012 (1889); Pollen v. Le Roy, 30 N.Y.
549 (1863); Mann v. National Linseed Oil Co., 87 Hun 558, 34 N.Y. Supp. 481 (5th Dep't
1895); House v. Babcock, 17 N.Y. Supp. 640 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1892); Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Lyncroft Grain Corp., 8 Misc. 2d 521, 166 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957). Of
course, expenses reasonably incurred in mitigating can be recovered even though they are
not added expenses of reselling. Cogswell v. Boehm, 5 N.Y. Supp. 67 (Sup. Ct. 1889), where
plaintiff-vendor had arranged with his mortgagees to discharge his mortgages at the closing
with defendant-vendee, upon vendee's breach, plaintiff borrowed money to discharge these
mortgages; he recovered the expenses of the loan as incidental damages; Fox v. Woods, 96
N.Y. Supp. 117 (App. T. 1905), where plaintiff-tenant contracted to sell her leasehold to
defendant, on the latter's breach, plaintiff made rental payments until she arranged resale of
the leasehold; she recovered the rental payments as incidental damages. The items in the
last two cases could, alternatively, be treated as part of the subtrahend-the value to
plaintiff of the difference between what defendant promised and what he performed.
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dollars to reflect the increase in delivery costs. 14 T Both ways of accom-
plishing this result are possible in cases where plaintiff actually has in-
curred the 35 dollar item before trial.1 4 However it is accomplished,
plaintiff, rather than defendant, should have the burden149 of proving
that the recovery should be augmented by 10 dollars more than would
have been allowed if both sets of delivery costs had been ignored."'o
While nine New York cases are in accord with these notions,l"' two cases
refused to allow incidentals' recovery'1 2
V. LOST VOLUME
Often after breach, plaintiff resells in completed form to a new buyer
the performance once destined for defendant. Sometimes, plaintiff thereby
deprives himself of something of value-sale to the new buyer of another
similar performance. If there had been no breach and, consequently, no
resale, plaintiff would have sold two similar performances-one to
defendant and one to the new buyer. The breach and resale have reduced
plaintiff's total volume of sales by the quantity that was resold to the
new buyer.l 3
147. Almy v. Simonson, 52 Hun 535, 5 N.Y. Supp. 696 (1st Dep't 18S9); Dunn v. Allen,
55 App. Div. 637, 67 N.Y. Supp. 218 (4th Dep't 1900) (dictum).
148. Where plaintiff has not resold before trial, but must incur the extra expense to
resell, the extra expense should be taken into account, but this can only be done as an
adjustment to the subtrahend. See Seller's Damages (Michigan) S92. New York law Seems
to be in accord. Dunn v. Allen, supra note 147 (dictum).
149. Worcester Bleach & Dye Works Co. v. Dlugnsch, 181 N.Y. Supp. 44 (App. T.
1920), in which incidental expenses incurred were disallowed for want of evidence that
they were "reasonable"-i.e., justified as an effort to mitigate.
150. If resale is less costly than performance with defendant would have been, the
subtrahend should he enhanced to that extent. Dunn v. Allen, 55 App. Div. 637, 67 N.Y.
Supp. 218 (4th Dep't 1900) (dictum).
151. Cases cited notes 146 & 147 supra.
152. I criticize Hayden v. Pinchot, 172 App. Div. 102, 105-06, 158 N.Y. Supp. 215, 218
(1st Dep't 1916), which disallowed plaintiff-vendor's recovery of the broker's commission
paid for the resale and taxes paid between breach and resale; and Pcrlman v. Levy, 109
N.Y. Supp. 7M5 (App. T. 1903), which rejected proof of plaintiff's net receipts from the
public auction at which he resold the going business that defendant had refuscd to accept;
the court wanted proof of the gross receipts. Perhaps the results would have been different
if plaintiff showed, in Hayden, whether or not breach enabled him to save a broher's com-
mission on the original sale, and whether, in Perlman, the expenses of the auction were
reasonable. I also criticize Hayes v. Durham, 194 App. Div. S48, 851, 185 N.Y. Supp. 691,
693 (3d Dep't 1921), where plaintiff's recovery w.-as reduced by $75 to reflect the amount
he spent preparing goods for a resale buyer, although breach enabled him to save preLely
the same sum which he would have spent preparing the goods for defendant; since these
items cancel out, there should have been no adjustment to reflect this $75 item. See Seller's
Damages (Michigan) S90-93.
153. See 1 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 304 (1937); 5 Corbin § 11C0, at 539;
McCormick § 41; Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 Yale L.J. 443, 4SS
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Where, prior to the trial, there has been a resale of the performance
with attendant lost volume, the value of the lost volume can be taken
into account in either of two ways: (1) by adjusting the value of the
subtrahend to reflect it, or (2) by treating the lost volume as an item
of incidental damages. Where there has been no such resale before trial,
but damages are being computed as if plaintiff had made such a resale,
the value of the lost volume should be taken into account as an adjust-
ment of the subtrahend. The subtrahend (actual resale value of the
entity) should be reduced by the value to plaintiff of the lost volume.
As will be shown shortly, its value is the profit that he would have made
on such an additional sale.
To take a simplified example, if plaintiff is a car retailer who sells
all his cars of a certain model at 3,000 dollars, and defendant-customer
refuses to honor his promise to accept one, and resale would be attended
by lost volume, the minuend is the unpaid balance of the price-3,000
dollars. The subtrahend is the resale value of the performance (3,000
dollars), reduced by the profit that plaintiff would have made on the
lost sale-hypothetically, 500 dollars. Deducting the adjusted subtrahend,
2,500 dollars, from the minuend, 3,000 dollars, plaintiff should recover
500 dollars plus any incidental expenses. In this particular instance, his
recovery is identical with the profit he would have enjoyed on the con-
tract with defendant if there had been no breach, but this is not always
the case.154
To carry his burden of proving that resale 55 impaired total volume,
plaintiff must establish: (1) even if there had been no breach, he would
have solicited this particular resale buyer' to buy from him; (2) this
buyer would have bought; and (3) plaintiff had the ability to perform
both the plaintiff-defendant contract and the plaintiff-resale-buyer con-
(1908); Waters, The Concept of Market in the Sale of Goods, 36 Can. B. Rev. 360
(1958); Comment, 34 Can. B. Rev. 969 (1956); Note, 22 Cornell L.Q. 581 (1937); Com-
ment, 65 Yale L.J. 992, 993 (1956); Annots., 24 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1952); 120 A.L.R. 1192
(1939); 44 A.L.R. 349 (1926).
154. Recovery would be different from the amount of profit lost if (1) part of the
price had been prepaid, or (2) there were incidental damages in addition to the lost
volume, or (3) resale cost a unit of volume but did not occur at the same price as the
contract price.
155. "Resale" is used hereafter to include both a factual resale and the putative resale
used as a reference point when the entity's resale value fixes the subtrahend, although in
fact plaintiff failed to resell.
156. If plaintiff in fact resold before trial a specified entity scheduled for defendant,
this resale purchaser can be identified at the trial. Otherwise, he is a putative person, used
as a reference point in valuation. In the latter event, his "behavior" if le had not "bought"
the "resold" entity can be known only through inferences drawn from the original
contract with defendant and the general nature of plaintiff's business. In the former event,
evidence about his particular plans and wants should be admitted.
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tract. 7 If plaintiff is not in the business of selling this kind of perform-
ance, the court should presume that he would not have solicited this
particular resale buyer in the absence of defendant's breach. Even if
plaintiff is in this line of business, there should be no presumption that
he would have solicited this particular buyer unless plaintiff's business
is of a sort characterized by continuous high levels of spending on
merchandising and the buyer was in the market which plaintiff ordinarily
canvassed.
New York's batfles over recognition of the lost volume phenomenon
have been waged in cases involving sellers of automobiles."' The first
case took account of the phenomenon.5 9 Counterclaimant was a nation-
wide distributor of Reo automobiles, who had contracted with the manu-
facturer to take the entire factory output of these cars. The counterclaim
was brought against a retailer who had agreed to buy 420 cars but had
never ordered them out. The jury was instructed that the counterclaimant
should recover his lost profits, i.e., the contract price less "the cost to
the defendant of furnishing the cars in question."''6 A judgment entered
upon the jury verdict was affirmed by the court of appeals."" The su-
preme court decision had noted (1) that counterclaimant did extensive
advertising; (2) that counterclaimant had no "available market" for
resale of these 420 cars, since (a) his was the only source of this
particular brand of car and (b) his price controlled the consumer price
for these cars; (3) that the sale was to be at a fixed price; (4) that
there was limited demand for such cars; (5) that the manufacturer
could have filled all the counterclaimant's orders even if these cars had
been ordered out; and (6) that counterclaimant would not have in-
creased his overhead expenses if he had handled these cars as well as
those actually sold.', 2
'While the court applied the Uniform Sales Act to the case, it made it
clear that the result was not due to peculiar language in the Act; the
Act merely codified common law rules in this area. 65
Although the court obviously was struggling to identify the precise
157. In a prior article, I listed a fourth condition, but it appears to have so little
practical significance that I have abandoned it. See Seller's Damages (Alichigan) 903, 910.
15S. Perhaps some cases awarding "lost profits" on a components valuation rationale
have in their background some inkling that, if components valuation is wrong and the
subtrahend should be valued as an entity, a lost volume adjustment should be made. SLa
notes 124 & 125 supra and accompanying text.
159. Poppenberg v. R. Al. Owen & Co., 34 Misc. 126, 141-46, 146 N.Y. Supp. 478,
487-90 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
160. Id. at 141, 146 N.Y. Supp. at 437.
161. Poppenberg v. R. Al. Owen & Co., 221 N.Y. 569, 116 X.E. 1070 (1917) (memoran-
dum decision).
162. 34 Mlisc. at 141-45, 146 N.Y. Supp. at 4S7-S9.
163. Id. at 143, 146 N.Y. Supp. at 45S.
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reason why the cars should be valued at cost rather than resale value,
it seems fairly clear that it was reaching for the lost volume notions
just mentioned. That the counterclaimant probably would have sold
another 420 cars to whoever took the 420 that this retailer rejected is
fairly clear from the distribution system described; apparently, counter-
claimant sold only to its franchised retail dealers. It is equally clear
that whichever retailers absorbed these 420 cars would, but for breach,
have taken 420 other cars. This appears from the mention of limited
demand and advertising and fixed pricing. Clear, too, is counterclaim-
ant's ability to perform this contract and another identical to it, if there
were sufficient demand. The manufacturer could supply all orders placed
and the counterclaimant could handle an additional 420 cars without
increasing his overhead expense.
It is not possible to explain the result on the theory (apparently not
urged in the case) that the cars should be valued at cost because they
were not "on hand" at the time of breach. At the time of breach-when
the retailer should have ordered the cars, but failed to do so-counter-
claimant was committed to the manufacturer to take the latter's entire
output. It was not shown that counterclaimant could feasibly breach his
obligation to the manufacturer and, given the close relationship between
them, it should not be presumed. Nor was it shown that the manufac-
turer reduced his output by 420 cars in order to take account of the
retailer's defection.
In 1923, a divided bench at appellate term headed in the opposite
direction.164 Plaintiff was a car retailer. Defendant-consumer rejected a
Studebaker when it was tendered to him, and plaintiff had no other
orders for. this particular model that had been ordered for defendant.
The appellate term reversed the judgment below and held that plaintiff
should recover only the difference between the contract price and the
market price. The earlier case was "distinguished" on the ground that
absence of a market price was proved there. Perhaps the later case can
be read narrowly as a decision turning on plaintiff's failure to prove the
fulfillment of the three conditions necessary to resale impairing total
volume;" 5 but, in 1937, another case made it clear that the lost volume
adjustment itself was being rejected.'66
164. Lowas Garage Co. v. Scheer, 199 N.Y. Supp. 748 (App. T. 1923).
165. In Genovese v. A. Lenobel, Inc., 148 Misc. 548, 265 N.Y. Supp. 338 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.
1933), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 154 Misc. 91, 275 N.Y. Supp. 521 (App. T. 1934),
a retailer tried unsuccessfully to recover lost profits when a buyer repudiated his contract
to buy a Chrysler. The court refused to allow more than contract/market differential
because "there was an available market for Chrysler automobiles . . . the Chrysler 72 was
a stock model and . . . no particular car was appropriated on this contract." Id. at 550,
265 N.Y. Supp. at 340.
166. A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 533, 300 N.Y. Supp. 226 (2d Dep't 1937),
modified mem. on other grounds, 253 App. Div. 813, 1 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1938).
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In this case, plaintiff again was a car retailer. The car that defendant
rejected was resold for the same price that defendant had agreed to
pay. The appellate division held that no damages had been sustained,
rejecting plaintiff's argument that he should recover the profit lost on
one sale. Plaintiff, seeking to break out of the Uniform Sales Act's
general rule which would value the subtrahend by resale, argued that
under the terms of his franchise (a) he could sell only in a limited
area; (b) his selling price was fixed by the manufacturer; and (c) his
overhead must be met out of gross profit from his total volume of
sales.le?
The court based its opinion on several grounds: (1) that it was not
foreseeable to defendant at the time of contracting that breach would
cause loss of a unit of volume; (2) that the rule urged would embrace
a great many cases, leading to a mass exodus from the general rule of
the Sales Act; (3) that plaintiff was no worse off, in terms of total
volume, than if defendant had assigned the contract to a buyer who
otherwise would have bought another car from plaintiff; (4) that plain-
tiff's rule would lead to a laborious inquiry into the value of the overhead
lost, an inquiry which the buyer is hardly in a position to argue at trial;
(5) that, at the contract formation stage, plaintiff could have protected
himself more by (a) exacting a larger downpayment to be forfeited on
breach; (b) arranging for titie to pass before delivery; or (c) informing
defendant of the special circumstances present that lead to lost profits
upon defendant's breach.'
The last-mentioned remark suggests that a different result might have
been reached if plaintiff had given defendant adequate notice at the time
of contracting. Another hint that the case was not barring lost volume
adjustment in all cases came in the court's closing lines:
These views leave untouched the opportunity to a vendor to proffer proof that he v;as
put to a special or added expense on a particular resale which would possibly constitute
a "special circumstance" that would be a further element of damage, but this item
would not be evidenced by mere proof of the amount of gross profits on the original
sale, or mere proof of general elements of overhead.1s9
The court's best point seems to be the practical one that adjustment
to reflect lost volume complicates the proof at trial. However, in cases
where more is at stake than the 226.50 dollars before that court, it seems
fair to let the plaintiff try to show the extent of his loss. Discovery
devices are available here, as in other cases, to enable the defendant to
defend his interests. The other points, except the reference to foresee-
167. Id. at 535, 300 N.Y. Supp. at 229.
168. Id. at 536, 3C0 N.Y. Supp. at 230.
169. Id. at 537, 300 N.Y. Supp. at 231.
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ability, would seem to be true, but irrelevant. For example, the fact
that defendant could impair plaintiff's total volume lawfully by assign-
ing the contract seems a poor reason to permit defendant to impair
that volume unlawfully by breach.
Assuming that a car buyer lacks adequate notice that his breach will
impair the seller's total volume of sales-a point over which quibbling
is possible-it seems unwise to iequire precise foreseeability of that
consequence. The foreseeability, or contemplation, requirement makes
sense in cases where the issue is whether the minuend shall be valued
at replacement cost ("market") or by reference to the plaintiff-buyer's
lost profits on some larger transaction which aborted when defendant
failed to perform. In this context, the foreseeability and certainty tests
provide controls over potentially astronomical liability. In the present
context, there is no peril of astronomical liability and a much relaxed
foreseeability test should be used. Under a relaxed test, knowledge that
plaintiff was a retailer in cars would be sufficient for a reasonable man
to build the pile of inferences leading to the conclusion that breach
would cause lost profit, and this should satisfy the foreseeability test.
By 1959, if one appellate term case can serve as a basis of generaliza-
tion, 17' New York judges treated it as hornbook law that a car dealer
could not recover his lost profit when a customer rejected the car which
he had ordered. The early case which was affirmed by the court of
appeals,' 7 ' involving the distributor of Reos, was not so much distin-
guished as it was rejected in the light of subsequent lower court cases
going against it.
In view of the dearth of New York cases taking the lost volume
phenomenon into account, discussion of how lost volume should be valued
can be summary. The sole relevant case17 - apparently valued the lost
volume by deducting from the contract price of the 420 cars unsold
the variable costs that the seller would have incurred if he had sold
them. No adjustment was made to reflect saved overhead costs or re-
employed overhead assets because the court found that the seller's
overhead would not have been increased if he had handled 420 more
cars. This treatment accords with the notions that I have expressed
elsewhere.17 1
170. Babbitt v. Wides Motor Sales Corp., 17 Misc. 2d 889, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. T.
1959) (per curiam).
171. Poppenberg v. R. M. Owen & Co., 84 Misc. 126, 146 N.Y. Supp. 478 (Sup. C.),
aff'd mem., 165 App. Div. 946, 150 N.Y. Supp. 1107 (4th Dep't 1914), aff'd mem., 221 N.Y.
569, 116 N.E. 1070 (1917).
172. Ibid.
173. General Theory 601.
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VI. CONFUSION OF LOST VOLUME ADJUSTMENT AND
COMPONENTS APPROACH
Counsel and the court often refer to the components approach by
describing it as a formula which permits plaintiff-seller to recover his
"lost profits." This is dangerous terminology. In some situations, how-
ever, "components" valuation of the subtrahend gives plaintiff his
"mark-up profit," and this fact apparently gave rise to the terminology.
If breach occurs before plaintiff has received any payment from defend-
ant, and before plaintiff has delivered any performance to defendant,
and before plaintiff has "on hand" any non-overhead components of
performance, all the components saved are valued at cost. Indeed, the
subtrahend is identical to a list of the total costs of contract perform-
ance, and the minuend is identical to the contract price. The recovery
is contract price less total costs, plus incidental damages, if any. It is
only natural to regard such a formula as giving plaintiff his "lost profit"
-the difference between the contract price and what it would have cost
him to perform that contract with defendant.
174
When breach occurs after plaintiff has accomplished part of his per-
formance, if he still has no components on hand and has received nothing
from defendant, it is possible to view the formula as one involving re-
covery of two items: "lost profit" plus "costs incurred." 17 Even if
plaintiff has both delivered some performance and received some pay-
ment, the "lost profit" formulation can be retained by viewing the re-
covery as consisting now of three items: ("lost profit" plus "costs
incurred") minus such part of the price as has been paid.', And even
if plaintiff has delivered some performance, received some of defendant's
performance, and has some finished goods on hand but undelivered, the
174. E.g., Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. P. K. Wilson & Son, 235 N.Y. 4S9, 139 N.E.
533 (1923); Wasserman v. Broadalbin Knitting Co., 270 App. Div. 20, 53 N.Y.S2d 597 (3d
Dep't 1945), aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. S15, 72 N.E.2d 11 (1947); J. B. Preston Co. v. Funk-
houser, 235 App. Div. 2C0, 256 N.Y. Supp. 6S1 (1st Dep't 1932), modified on other grounds,
261 N.Y. 140, 134 N.E. 737, aff'd, 290 U.S. 163 (1933); Hfiltop Sand Corp. v. Simpson, 225
App. Div. 467, 233 N.Y. Supp. 34S (2d Dep't 1929); Industrial Eng'r Co. v. Republic
Storage Co., 220 App. Div. 17S, 220 N.Y. Supp. 623 (ist Dep't 1927).
175. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923);
Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. !JcKinney, 137 App. Div. 541, 121 'N.Y. Supp. 345 (3d Dep't
1910), affd mem., 203 N.Y. 533, 96 N.E. 1122 (1911) ; Carlin v. City of New York, 132 App.
Div. 90, 116 N.Y. Supp. 346 (2d Dep't 1909) ; Shapiro v. Ddollat, 168 N.Y. Supp. 723 (App.
T. 1918); I, ieser v. Times Realty & Constr. Co., 110 N.Y. Supp. 963 (App. T. 190S),
vacated on other grounds, 131 N.Y. Supp. 337 (N.Y. City Ct. 1910).
176. William Wharton, Jr. & Co. v. Winch, 140 N.Y. 237, 35 N.E. 5S9 (1893); Thieler
v. Trinity Advertising Corp., 241 App. Div. 34, 270 N.Y. Supp. 717 (1st Dep't), aWd mem.,
265 N.Y. 663, 193 N.E. 437 (1934); Dryfoos v. Uhl, 69 App. Div. 113, 74 N.Y. Supp.
532 (1st Dep't 1902); Goldstein v. Godfrey Co., 61 Misc. 64, 113 N.Y. Supp. 123 (App. T.
1908) (per curiam); Brockhurst v. Ryan, 2 Misc. 2d 747, 146 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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flavor can be retained by seeing in the formula four elements: ("lost
profit" plus "costs incurred") minus ("such part of the price as has
been paid" plus "the market [actual resale] value of the finished goods
on hand") .177
But this effort to retain the "lost profit" notion at all intellectual
costs involves unnecessary steps in computation, 178 and obscures the
justification for this measure of damages.179 Moreover, it invites the
judge to treat the "lost profit" involved in such suits as they treat "lost
profits" in other types of cases-requiring that the "lost profits" be
proved with certainty and be foreseeable to defendant at the time of
contract as potential items of loss in the event of his breach.18° The fact
that the "lost profit" involved in this components-valued plaintiff-seller
suit is markedly different from the "lost profits" involved in those other
suits is thereby obscured. 8'
New York case law bears the scars of this confusion of components-
valued plaintiff-seller cases and cases where a plaintiff-buyer seeks to
value the minuend by reference to the lost profits on a larger transaction
that aborted when defendant-seller breached. In Masterton v. Mayor of
the City of Brooklyn,18 decided in 1845, a building contractor was per-
mitted to use components valuation of the subtrahend. One component to
be valued consisted of the marble that he would have acquired and used in
the remaining three-and-one-half years of work that would have gone into
the construction job. At the time of breach, plaintiff had a subcontract
with an English quarry which was to furnish the stone. When defendant
breached the principal contract, plaintiff breached his supply contract
with the quarry. The trial court valued the yet-to-be-acquired stone at
the price that the plantiff would have paid to the quarry under the terms
of this supply contract. 18 3
The supreme court reversed on very narrow grounds: While the yet-to-
177. Cf. Dillon v. Anderson, 43 N.Y. 231 (1870); Lehmaier v. Standard Specialty &
Tube Co., 123 App. Div. 431, 108 N.Y. Supp. 402 (1st Dep't 1908); Beckwith v. City of
New York, 121 App. Div. 462, 106 N.Y. Supp. 175 (2d Dep't 1907).
178. The use of a lost profits formula often leads to the wasted motion of proof of
total costs and proof of costs incurred, rather than direct proof of costs yet to be incurred.
However, plaintiff often wants proof of costs incurred in the record in case. his expectation-
damage remedy fails and he must fall back to another remedy based on these costs.
179. See pp. 41-43 supra.
180. See p. 64 supra.
181. In the components-valued plaintiff-seller suit, there is nothing that properly can
be called "lost profits." What plaintiff saved thanks to breach is being valued component
by component on the assumption that he stopped work or should have stopped work
towards completion when he learned of defendant's breach.
182. 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
183. Id. at 66.
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be-acquired marble should be valued by reference to its cost, that cost
should be fixed by reference to the market and not by reference to the
particular subcontract that plaintiff had made before breach."' Four
reasons lay behind the reversal: (1) perhaps the supply contract was
at a price higher than the price that a reasonable man would have paid
for the stone; (2) since defendant would not enjoy any gains that
plaintiff might make on his supply contracts (in the event stone prices
in the spot market should rise after this long-term supply contract was
made), defendant should not be saddled with "losses" on such contracts;
(3) it was not established with certainty that plaintiff had to breach
the supply contract, nor was there certain proof of the amount of damages
plaintiff would have to pay his supplier; and (4) the damages to be
paid the supplier are too "remote'"-apparently in the sense of being un-
foreseeable to the defendant at contracting time.':-
The possibility that the subcontract was made unwisely seems suffi-
ciently slim that a court should presume it was wisely made unless
defendant introduced evidence to the contrary; plaintiff's self-interest
is fair assurance that in his pre-breach business activities he will try
to acquire supplies at the lowest price available.
The second reason really is a pair of reasons: (a) the cost in the
spot acquisition market at the time of breach might be lower than the
price term of plaintiff's long-term supply contract entered into at an
earlier date; and (b) since defendant would not be allowed to use a
long-term supply contract's price term where it was more than the spot
market at the time of breach, plaintiff should not be permitted to do
this when the spot market is the higher. But, since it is value to the
plaintiff which is being sought, the court should fix cost value in a
market and at a time that is relevant to one in plaintiff's position, at
least if plaintiff is acting reasonably and not enhancing damages by
wasteful conduct. There was nothing unreasonable about plaintiff's
decision to enter into a long-term supply contract and, to one with such
a contract, the movements of the spot market are irrelevant. The simple
answer to the "both ways test" is that defendant, too, should be per-
mitted to offer evidence of such a subcontract where its price term is
different from the spot market price.
The court's remarks about certainty and foreseeability are sound in
principle, with a single important qualification. The certainty and fore-
seeability tests should not be manipulated into major obstacles in this
context, although it is perfectly permissible to so handle them in cases
where plaintiff-buyer is seeking to value the minuend by reference to
1S4. Id. at 72.
185. Id. at 72-73.
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profits that he lost when breach caused some larger transaction to abort.
In the latter situation, but not in our case, there is a real peril that
plaintiff will recover damages much larger than anything defendant
contemplated or should have contemplated at the time of contracting.
While a concurring opinion in Masterton seemed to perceive the differ-
ence between "lost profits" in that plaintiff-buyer context and "lost
profits" in this plaintiff-seller context, 18 the majority opinion gave no
notice to this difference, and the subsequent chain of cases carrying the
Masterton rule to modern times discusses the foreseeability and certainty
requirements that block the use of subcontract evidence with no visible
recognition that those doctrines serve little function in this context. 87
The absurdity of excluding evidence of subcontract terms to help
establish plaintiff's saved costs is underlined by the courts' willingness
to accept other kinds of evidence which is hardly more probative.'88 Per-
haps one can discern in at least one of the cases a disenchantment with
the exclusionary rule and a willingness to turn sharp corners to evade it.8 9
Talking in terms of "lost profits" can lead to another brand of con-
fusion. New York courts sometimes overlook the fact that a "lost profit"
formula may be appropriate for either of two reasons in the plaintiff-
seller cases: because the subtrahend should be valued component by
component; or because the subtrahend, once valued as an entity, should
be reduced to reflect the lost profit on the sale that otherwise would
have been made to the resale purchaser. In one car dealer case, the court
186. Id. at 74-75 (concurring opinion).
187. Devlin v. Mayor of the City of New York, 63 N.Y. 8 (1875); Story v. New York
& H.R.R., 6 N.Y. 85 (1851); Louvin Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 242 App. Div. 181,
272 N.Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1934) ; Goepel v. Kurtz Action Co., 179 App. Div. 687, 167
N.Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't 1917); Wetter v. Kleinert, 139 App. Div. 220, 123 N.Y. Supp.
755 (2d Dep't 1910). The distinction was recognized in Long Island Contracting & Supply
Co. v. City of New York, 204 N.Y. 73, 97 N.E. 483 (1912), but its legal consequences were
inverted. The court of appeals permitted valuation of the minuend by reference to the price
at which plaintiff could have resold the goods that defendant failed to deliver, and
announced that this was permissible because it involved direct, not collateral, profits. Some
of the court's confusion probably flowed from the fact that plaintiff in that case was
simultaneously a seller of services and a buyer of goods.
188. In Isaacs v. Terry & Tench Co., 132 App. Div. 657, 117 N.Y. Supp. 369 (1st
Dep't 1909), the price actually paid to the supplier, after breach, fixed the goods' value
although there was apparently no showing that the supply contract was reasonable. Plaintiff's
own testimony about costs of completion has been allowed. Wasserman v. Broadalbin
Knitting Co., 270 App. Div. 20, 58 N.Y.S.2d 597 (3d Dep't 1945), aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 815,
72 N.E.2d 11 (1947); Deery v. Williams, 27 App. Div. 131, 50 N.Y. Supp. 138 (1st Dep't
1898); Engel v. Mutual Garment Co., 166 N.Y. Supp. 981 (App. T. 1917).
189. Goepel v. Kurtz Action Co., 179 App. Div. 687, 167 N.Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't
1917), where plaintiff-jobber was allowed to use evidence of his supplier's manufacturing
costs to establish the reasonable costs of manufacture from which reasonable cost to
plaintiff could be inferred.
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rejected a lost profit formula on the theory that New York does not
take lost volume adjustments into account, and then apparently over-
looked the possibility that such a formula might be appropriate on the
other rationale-the subtrahend should be components valued.',, In
many cases where the struggle between components and entity valuation
has been resolved in favor of the latter, there was no visible inquiry into
the next logical question: Did resale of the entity impair total volume? 0 1
VII. CONCLUSION
From examination of over 200 New York plaintiff-seller expectation
damage cases, some conclusions emerge clearly. The vast bulk of issues
are resolved in every instance as suggested in this article. Only the dis-
crepant rulings need to be mentioned in this summary. In two'02 of the
nineteen cases in which counsel contested the issue of components versus
entity valuation, the courts resolved the issue differently from what I
would have done. In five more cases0 3 that are apparently resolved cor-
rectly, insufficient facts appear in the opinions to make me certain that the
case was characterized properly, although the right result was attached
to the category selected. Perhaps, in some of these cases, erroneous
results obtained.
My distinction between multi-contract assets and other assets is un-
known in New York. Multi-contract assets yet to be acquired at the
time of breach either may be handled like other costs yet to be incurred
or they may (in effect) be valued at zero-which works to plaintiff's
advantage. Multi-contract assets on hand at the time of breach may be
valued as I have suggested, or they, too, may be valued at zero. There
seems to be no rationality in the courts' choice between these two treat-
ments. One hoary case made an arbitrary reduction in plaintiff's recovery
in order to reflect saved multi-contract assets, but this technique has
not been repeated. 94
Another arbitrary area concerns cases in which plaintiff is a seller of
fairly fungible delegable services. If plaintiff is a maritime carrier, the
190. Genovese v. A. Lenobel, Inc., 148 Misc. 54S, 265 N.Y. Supp. 333 (Munic. CL N.Y.
1933), revd per curiam on other grounds, 154 .Misc. 91, 275 N.Y. Supp. 521 (App. T. 1934).
191. See Belle of Bourbon Co. v. Leffler, S7 App. Div. 302, 84 N.Y. Supp. 385 (Ist Dep't
1903); cases cited note 123 supra. In none of these cases is there any dear elocusAon of the
possibility that resale cost volume. For such a discussion see A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Snif, 252
App. Div. 533, 300 N.Y. Supp. 226 (2d Dep't 1937), modified mem. on other grounds, 253
App. Div. 813, 1 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1933).
192. Isaacs v. Terry & Tench Co., 125 App. Div. 532, 109 N.Y. Supp. 792 (Ist Dcp't
1908), discussed at notes 55-62 supra and accompanying text; Varley v. Belford, 156 N.Y.
Supp. 597 (App. T. 1916), supra note 76.
193. Cases cited notes 64 & 75 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 77-SS supra.
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proprietor of an establishment furnishing room and board, or a publisher
selling advertising space which has a fixed location in the publication,
mitigation notions require him to try to resell the space originally slated
for defendant. All other sellers of fungible delegable services apparently
are free to ignore the possibility of reselling what defendant failed to
take. ' I would let all these sellers of fungible services enjoy the benefit
of the same set of presumptions, as they endeavor to show either (1)
that it was reasonable to avoid resale after breach, and/or (2) resale
would have impaired total volume sold.
New York's recent lower court cases have rejected the idea of re-
flecting the impact of resale on the total volume of sales, although a
groping older case pioneered in this area.00 These cases reflect the usual
widespread confusion of the two rationales for giving a plaintiff-seller
"lost profits"-lost volume and components valuation. And they reflect
the usual confusion of the plaintiff-seller's and the plaintiff-buyer's "lost
profits." This takes the form, among others, of a refusal to permit plain-
tiffs-sellers to establish the saved cost of yet-to-be-acquired components
by evidence of subcontracts, existing at the time of breach, with sup-
pliers who were to furnish such components to plaintiff. I have not en-
countered this particular taboo in any other jurisdiction studied.' 7
Perhaps in the realm of trivia are two aberrational New York cases
refusing recovery of incidental damages'0 8 and the trial judge who forgot
that defendant's total breach, while it excuses plaintiff from further
performance, does not excuse him from taking into account what he
saved when relieved of the duty to complete performance.' 0
195. See note 125 supra.
196. Poppenberg v. R. M. Owen & Co., 84 Misc. 126, 146 N.Y. Supp. 478 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd mem., 165 App. Div. 946, 150 N.Y. Supp. 1107 (4th Dep't 1914), aff'd mem., 221 N.Y.
569, 116 N.E. 1070 (1917); see text accompanying notes 158-70 supra.
197. See text accompanying notes 174-91 supra.
198. The two aberrational cases appear in note 152 supra, and the eight conventional
cases are collected in notes 146 & 147 supra.
199. Sackman v. Stephenson, 11 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (correspondence school
recovers undiminished price despite not sending out all the lessons). Perhaps the result was
correct on the rationale elaborated at the end of note 66 supra.
